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DEMAND RESPONSE’S THREE GENERATIONS: MARKET 
PATHWAYS AND CHALLENGES IN THE MODERN ELECTRIC GRID 
Joel B. Eisen* 
Through a historical analysis spanning nearly five decades, 
this Article provides a comprehensive discussion of how demand 
response (reductions in electricity consumption in response to grid 
emergencies or price signals) has become both a growing resource 
on the electric grid and a policy trailblazer in the grid’s ongoing 
transformation. The discussion centers on three separate 
generations of efforts to promote demand-side measures in the 
electric grid, dating to the 1960s and oriented chronologically 
around important events in the electric power industry.  
Demand response has been a test bed of important regulatory 
principles like frameworks for interactivity with the grid, the role 
of third parties and new business models, and the split of 
regulatory jurisdiction between states and FERC. For this reason, 
the Article introduces and discusses the concept of “market 
pathways”—experiences learned from combinations of technology 
advances, regulatory innovations, and judicial and regulatory 
proceedings that tested demand response’s legitimacy and 
implementation. These pathways, the Article claims, now form a 
significant part of the foundation for overhauling the electric grid 
to accommodate all distributed energy resources, not simply 
demand response. Thus, the Article concludes, demand response is 
important for the long-term, iterative regulatory strategies that 
promoted it, viewed against the context of the electric power 
industry’s ever changing overall regulatory and policy landscape. 
The Article concludes with an examination of “demand 
response 3.0.” This is the current industry landscape in which the 
green light for innovation and experimentation, combined with 
further advances in technology and the rise of sophisticated 
distributed energy resources (including energy storage, distributed 
solar PV, and others), have prompted policymakers to steer the 
electric grid towards a modernized, two-way, participatory system. 
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This Article concludes that the lessons learned from decades of 
demand-side participation in the grid will be useful in blazing a 
policy path toward a participatory grid, and applies these 
strategies and principles to guide future policymaking. 
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This Article’s aim is two-fold. First, it explains something that 
once would have seemed wholly improbable about demand 
response—the electric power industry’s term for reductions in 
electricity consumption in response to grid emergencies or price 
signals.1 Demand response is something that the industry has more 
or less shunned since its inception, economists often find 
suboptimal, and consumers do not yet seem to truly understand or 
want. Yet, despite all that, it is now both a growing resource on the 
electric grid and a policy trailblazer in the grid’s ongoing 
transformation. Second, it describes how the principles and lessons 
learned in the nearly fifty-year history of demand-side measures in 
the electric grid, including the fifteen years since demand response 
began to participate as a resource in the nation’s organized 
wholesale markets, inform the ongoing transformation of this staid 
industry. 
The electric power sector is undergoing an upheaval 
unparalleled in its history.2 A wide range of technologies and 
                                                
* Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow, University of Richmond 
School of Law. The author thanks the North Carolina Journal of Law & 
Technology for its kind invitation to publish this Article in conjunction with its 
symposium on “The Impact of Demand Response Technology on the Electricity 
Sector.”  
 1 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
 2 James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and 
Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 
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business models are bringing rapid change to an industry not 
generally known to have an appetite for it.3 Distributed energy 
resources are playing a larger role in meeting demand and 
stabilizing the grid.4 Consider this (hardly exhaustive) list: “A 
variety of emerging distributed technologies—including flexible 
demand, distributed generation, energy storage, and advanced 
power electronics and control devices—are creating new options 
for the provision and consumption of electricity services.”5 This 
has prompted states and the federal government to consider grid 
modernization, which promises a radically different electric grid 
than that of past decades and extensive changes to the monopoly 
business models of utilities that have dominated the grid for over a 
century. Some efforts have involved installation of physical 
devices to overhaul the grid, and some have come in the policy 
arena where regulators and other policymakers seek to make the 
electric grid cleaner, more efficient, and more reliable. 
At this inflection point in the grid’s arc, demand response has 
been a focal point for deciding momentous policy questions, 
including those addressed in the 2016 Supreme Court decision 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply 
Association (“FERC v. EPSA”).6 That decision upheld the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) rule, Order 745,7 which 
                                                                                                         
73 (2014) (“The electricity industry has changed in fundamental ways . . . never 
contemplated by the drafters of the FPA.”). 
 3 For discussions of industry transformation, see MIT ENERGY INIT., UTILITY 
OF THE FUTURE viii (2016), https://energy.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf; EDISON ELEC. 
INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (2013), 
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. 
 4 See generally Distributed Energy Resources, ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., 
http://www2.epri.com/Our-Work/Pages/Distributed-Electricity-Resources.aspx 
(last visited May 12, 2016). 
 5 MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at viii. 
 6 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
 7 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 
76 Fed. Reg. 16,657, 16,659 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
[hereinafter Order 745]. For contemporaneous analysis of demand response and 
Order 745, see Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority 
over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN 
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required that demand response be compensated at the full energy 
market price. 
This Article argues that demand response has taken center 
stage in the grid modernization debate precisely because it was 
overlooked for decades. Persistently knocking at the industry’s 
door, it struggled for years to gain full acceptance and participation 
in electricity markets. Finally, after fifteen years of remarkable 
progress, it is significantly closer to that goal. Thus, demand 
response is important for the long-term, iterative regulatory 
strategies that promoted it, viewed against the context of the 
electric power industry’s ever changing overall regulatory and 
policy landscape. 
As a result of this decades-long evolution, demand response 
continues to grow into an even more valuable grid resource, and 
the lessons learned along the way are useful in blazing a policy 
path toward a two-way, participatory electric grid.8 These “market 
pathways”—experiences learned from combinations of technology 
advances, regulatory innovations, and judicial and regulatory 
proceedings that tested demand response’s legitimacy and 
implementation—now form a significant part of the foundation for 
overhauling the grid to accommodate distributed energy resources. 
With demand response, we have been working out the bugs for 
fifteen years, although much more work is still required. 
Demand response alone did not (and will not) change the 
electric grid. But how demand response transformed from an 
afterthought to a valuable grid resource, particularly through 
FERC’s efforts, matters greatly. It has established important 
principles that others can and will use in promoting energy storage, 
electric vehicles, and distributed solar as they are improving and 
impacting the grid in ever increasing amounts. Significant 
questions have been asked repeatedly and addressed through policy 
                                                                                                         
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates 
the Smart Grid?]; Richard J. Pierce Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a 
Critique of FERC Order 745, 102 GEO. WASH. U. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102 
(2011). 
 8 Shelley Welton, Clean Energy Justice, COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(discussing attributes of a “participatory grid”). 
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development and tests of those policies. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has upheld important elements of the path. FERC v. EPSA, 
and, by extension, the Court’s support for other FERC demand 
response policies, validates electric grid transformation and 
experimentation, not simply the single agency rule at issue in the 
case. 
Part I begins with two threshold matters: addressing the 
confusion about what demand response is, and discussing demand 
response’s benefits for a modern grid. Then, Part II transitions to 
the 1970s, when the providers of demand-side resources began a 
long battle to be treated comparably with generation in the electric 
grid. As such, FERC v. EPSA’s ratification of comparability was 
no mean feat. As Part II discusses and Part III elaborates further, 
its proponents have constantly had to defend the proposition that 
demand reductions (“negawatts”) were things, and that they should 
be treated the same as “megawatts.” Part III then discusses FERC’s 
efforts to put demand response on a level playing field with 
generation in organized wholesale markets. An important 
component of this policy development is FERC’s recognition and 
support of participation by third-party entrepreneurs competing 
with utilities with different business model characteristics and the 
Supreme Court finally sanctioning this experimentation. FERC’s 
efforts have resulted in tremendous progress, although there is still 
suboptimal demand response participation. 
As this Article’s title suggests, to organize the disparate 
elements of this story, it is useful to speak of three generations of 
demand-side measures with specific combinations of technologies 
and policies encouraging demand-side participation. This Article 
terms these demand response 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, respectively, and 
orients them chronologically around important events in the 
electric power industry that influenced demand-side participation. 
These events include the enactment of the federal energy statutes 
of the 1970s, the utility industry restructuring of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and the growth of wholesale electricity markets in the 
2000s. Part II discusses the first generation of demand-side 
measures after the enactment of federal energy statutes encouraged 
it. It shows that demand response techniques are not a creature of 
the Internet age, although “demand response 1.0” is a bit of a 
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misnomer because that term did not come into vogue until the 
2000s. Still, Part II uses the term to illustrate continuity in policy 
themes, as the early years show the persistence of debates that have 
recurred for decades. Part II concludes with a discussion of 
retrenchment from mandated demand-side management programs, 
and lower spending, in the industry’s restructuring of the 1990s. 
Part III begins when industry participants and observers first 
conceived of “demand response”: the California electricity crisis of 
2000-2001 and its aftermath. Demand response’s second 
generation features the emergence and growth of competitive 
wholesale markets, sparked by transformational FERC Orders. Part 
III traces how demand response programs evolved in the wholesale 
markets for the next fifteen years, discusses barriers that inhibited 
participation, and analyzes FERC Orders developed to address 
those barriers. Part III concludes with FERC v. EPSA’s holding 
that demand response can at times have as much value as power 
and can trade at market rates. Finally, after nearly fifty years, the 
notion of a level playing field for demand side resources has been 
ratified, if not always achieved yet in practice. FERC v. EPSA 
would be important for this reason alone, even if it had not also 
confirmed a tectonic shift in our understanding of electricity 
federalism whose ramifications may last for decades.9 
Part IV then turns to “demand response 3.0,” the current 
landscape in which the green light for innovation and 
experimentation, combined with further advances in technology 
and the rise of sophisticated distributed energy resources 
(including energy storage, distributed solar PV, and others) have 
prompted more market opportunities. There may eventually be 
distribution-level markets, as contemplated in proceedings such as 
                                                
 9 Articles discussing this significant development include: Joel B. Eisen, Dual 
Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. 
WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity 
Federalism Is Dead]; Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner 
Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, 
FERC v. EPSA]; Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. 
L. REV. 399 (2016). 
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New York’s landmark Reforming the Energy Vision effort.10 Part 
IV continues with a discussion of lessons learned and observations 
about how they may translate to this rapidly evolving landscape. 
The Court has now settled the issue of demand response’s 
importance as a grid resource. However, there is still  a suboptimal 
amount of it in electricity markets. There is no organic demand for 
using less electricity. Progress to more demand-side participation 
in the grid takes place against a backdrop of hostility, so programs 
can be derailed by those adversely affected by incentives for 
demand response. Opposition from entrenched players, particularly 
incumbent utilities and generators of electricity and their allies, can 
slow progress. In fact, opponents have made arguments against it 
for decades, such as the jurisdictional claim that FERC v. EPSA 
finally resolved. The relationship between the states and the federal 
government is complicated by the presence of demand response 
programs at both levels, requiring difficult discussions and 
complex coordination. 
Thus, improving technologies alone is insufficient, and policy 
support has been indispensable to demand response’s success, as is 
the case for other distributed energy resources. Working out the 
rules for participation has required considerable tinkering and 
iteration, and the path of progress has hardly been straight. 
Progress has always depended upon the presence of visionary state 
and federal regulators who see the need for innovation. When 
policy support has lagged, especially at major inflection points in 
the industry’s evolution, so too has demand-side participation. 
Even as new market opportunities develop, but are just emerging 
and beginning to be defined, this suggests progress may take much 
longer and be less linear than one might gather from the current 
enthusiasm. On the other hand, considering that demand response 
emerged from the shadows to become a major factor in the grid’s 
evolution, it would seem that almost anything is possible. 
                                                
 10 Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SVC., 
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA0
07DCFE2?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
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I. DEMAND RESPONSE AND THE ELECTRIC GRID, 
EXPLAINED 
To begin this decades-long story, we must first address a 
threshold matter: what is demand response? Without an 
understanding of the electric grid and its complexities, this term 
has no meaning. Paying a customer to not buy a product has no 
analogue outside of the electric power industry, not to markets for 
pears, clothing, or furniture.11 Companies that do this would 
eventually go out of business, and demand response has always 
been viewed as something that “seems to run counter to the normal 
operation of markets.”12 And there is another problem. It has 
understandably been tough to tell what demand response is. One 
article observes that it “can mean many different things to many 
different people.”13 The two words are exceedingly opaque, and it 
does not help that “demand response” encompasses about a dozen 
different strategies to reduce consumption, none of which is easily 
suggested by the name.14 This Part begins by clarifying this 
confusion, and then segues into a discussion of demand response’s 
benefits to the modern grid. 
A. So . . . What Exactly Is Demand Response? 
At its core, demand response involves a utility (or someone 
else) paying a customer to buy less of something (electricity) that 
customer needs, day in and day out. One early form of demand 
response was “interruptible” rates, or lower prices offered in return 
                                                
 11 James Bushnell et al., When It Comes to Demand Response, Is FERC Its 
Own Worst Enemy?, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 9, 11 (2009) (“[T]he notion that 
consumers must pay and make decisions based on a real-time price is a fact of 
life in all industries without explicit price regulation.”). 
 12 Cliff Rochlin, The Alchemy of Demand Response: Turning Demand into 
Supply, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 10, 11 (2009). 
 13 Stuart Schare & Brett Feldman, A New Era of Demand Response, POWER 
ENGINEERING (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.power-
eng.com/articles/print/volume-119/issue-8/features/a-new-era-of-demand-
response.html. 
 14 Michael Panfil, How the Electricity World has Changed: Demand Response 
and the Story of this Clean Energy Resource (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@EDFEnergyEX/how-the-electricity-world-has-changed-
cdb4e56b9b24#.q4p89oqwy. 
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for the utility’s right to “call” (demand usage reductions) at 
specific times. Decades ago, utilities would pick up the phone and 
call on altruistic commercial and industrial customers “to cut load 
in an ad hoc fashion, working their phones to find good corporate 
citizens willing to turn off non-essential lighting, motors or other 
equipment.”15 Here is the origin of “call” to refer to an occasion of 
demand reduction. Interruptible rates enshrined this custom as 
utility policy, giving these customers power up to a baseline at the 
standard rate, and power above that at a reduced rate.16 
Another early form was “direct load control” programs, in 
which utilities used simple one-way radio communications 
employed during system emergencies or times of high electricity 
prices.17 The utility sent a signal, and receivers affixed to the 
participating appliances either “shed” demand (turned off the 
machines) or ran the appliances on shorter cycles. A typical 
program could involve the use of a switch to shut off participating 
residential consumers’ air conditioning units for part of some hours 
during peak periods in return for a monthly flat fee.18 The customer 
could not control this simple on-off process; switching happened 
automatically (hence the “direct” moniker19), and utilities had full 
control. In return, customers typically received financial 
                                                
 15 Douglas W. Caves et al., The Cost of Electric Power Interruptions in the 
Industrial Sector: Estimates Derived from Interruptible Service Programs, 68 
LAND ECON. 49, 52 (1992). 
 16 Id. 
 17 PETER CAPPERS ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., MARKET AND 
POLICY BARRIERS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING ANCILLARY SERVICES IN 
U.S. MARKETS 23 (2013). 
 18 Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of 
Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 
28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 394 (2007). The compensation was not tied to the demand 
reduction’s value. Former FERC Chairman, Jon Wellinghoff, noted that, “As 
these programs were structured, consumers did not see real time wholesale price 
signals, nor were consumers compensated for the full value they contributed to 
the system by shedding load.” Id. 
 19 G. Heber Weller, New Wave of Direct Load Control: Update on DLC 
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incentives. Programs usually had design features that restricted 
how often the utility could call events, how long each event could 
last, and so forth.20 This form of obtaining demand reductions from 
specific devices such as air conditioners, water heaters, and pool 
pumps is still widely used.21 
Now, for some more contemporary forms of demand response. 
FERC recently brought attention to what it called a shining new 
example of the electric grid’s transformation.22 In it, the utility 
Southern California Edison is teaming up with innovator darling 
Nest, and is going to pay the consumer to “use less energy when 
everyone else is using more.”23 The “Rush Hour Rewards” 
program uses the Nest thermostat, and now that little “smart” orb 
on the wall is also a cash cow. In industry-speak, Rush Hour 
Rewards is a “peak time reward” program. At the most critical 
times when the utility needs it, customers get a rebate on their bill 
for reducing consumption.24 Rush Hour Rewards is a form of 
“dynamic pricing,” the collective term for the acronym soup of 
programs that change flat rate pricing for consumers.25 
In other industries, we would call this “pricing,” since the 
“dynamic” response would follow from the consumer’s sensitivity 
                                                
 20 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 23. 
 21  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM xix (2006). 
 22 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND 
ADVANCED METERING 34 (2016) [hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2016]. 
 23 Rush Hour Rewards, NEST, https://nest.com/energy-partners/southern-
california-edison/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 24 Jeff St. John, Inside Nest’s 50,000-Home Virtual Power Plant for Southern 
California Edison, GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/inside-nests-50000-home-virtual-
power-plant-for-southern-california-edison. Customers also receive a one-time 
payment at enrollment. 
 25 FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 19. Dynamic pricing techniques 
include real-time pricing, critical peak pricing, variable peak pricing, and time-
of-use rates (although the last of these is sometimes not included because it is 
administratively set ahead of time). Time-of-use rates typically split electricity 
prices into peak prices and off-peak prices. Critical peak pricing is similar but 
adds a critical peak component invoked during system emergencies or periods of 
high wholesale prices. Real-time pricing is, as the name implies, a variable rate, 
generally on an hourly basis. 
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to prices. This is such an intuitive feature of competitive markets 
that many economists would prefer the use of dynamic pricing in 
place of any other form of demand response. Pass through 
wholesale costs, have consumers pay the true price of electricity, 
and they will do all the demand responding anyone would ever 
need.26 But electricity markets are unique, because wholesale costs 
cannot be passed directly to consumers, the vast majority of whom 
still have fixed electric rates set by public utility commissions 
(“PUCs”). Dynamic pricing is a chimera, painfully slow to be 
adopted over the past several decades and still far from ubiquitous 
for a wide variety of reasons, including a lack of political 
acceptability.27 
Part III discusses the type of demand response at issue in 
FERC v. EPSA: bidding of demand reductions in organized 
wholesale markets administered by “independent system 
operators” (“ISOs”) and “regional transmission organizations” 
                                                
 26 Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 10–11 (calling this a “simple but elusive 
step”). 
 27 Numerous studies have evaluated the barriers to more widespread uptake of 
dynamic pricing. For a snapshot see ANNIKA TODD, PETER CAPPERS & CHARLES 
GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER 
ENROLLMENT IN TIME-BASED RATE AND ENABLING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 
(2013), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-6247e.pdf; PETER CAPPERS, 
ANNIKA TODD & CHARLES GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
SUMMARY OF UTILITY STUDIES (2013), 
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl-6248e.pdf; Paul L. Joskow & 
Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381 
(2012), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/wolfram/Papers/AEA%20DYNAMIC%20PRIC
ING.pdf; Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Household Response To Dynamic 
Pricing of Electricity-A Survey of the Experimental Evidence (2009), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2009/The%20Power%20of%20Exper
imentation%20_01-11-09_.pdf; NICOLE HOPPER, CHARLES GOLDMAN & BERNIE 
NEENAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DEMAND RESPONSE FROM DAY-
AHEAD HOURLY PRICING FOR LARGE CUSTOMERS (2006), 
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/report-lbnl-59630.pdf; CHUCK GOLDMAN ET 
AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DOES REAL-TIME PRICING DELIVER 
DEMAND RESPONSE? A CASE STUDY OF NIAGARA MOHAWK’S LARGE 
CUSTOMER RTP TARIFF (2004), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/report-
lbnl-54974.pdf. 
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(“RTOs”),28 the operators of our regional grids. These bids often 
come through market intermediaries called “aggregators” or 
“curtailment service providers” (“CSPs”) that act as intermediaries, 
gathering demand reductions from individual sources into larger 
blocks and then offering them into the wholesale markets.29 They 
contract with retail customers who wish to participate in the 
markets, often because the customers could not do so directly, due 
to minimum size restrictions and other limitations discussed below. 
CSPs bid demand reductions from individual commercial, 
industrial, and residential customers into the markets, sometimes 
aggregating smaller demand reductions into one block. A 
rudimentary example of how this works in practice is the “movie 
theater” program described in an early report.30 The CSP 
ConsumerPowerline aggregated all of the tenants within an 
apartment complex in its demand response program. As the report 
noted, “[i]f they are notified, the tenants are given free passes to 
the local movie theater as long as they agree to turn off all non-
essential equipment in their apartments when they leave. The 
movie theater stamps the tickets as further verification that 
customers participated.”31 
What do these techniques have in common? Whether a 
residential consumer takes part in Rush Hour Rewards or contracts 
with a CSP for demand reductions bid into a market, the end result 
is the same: reduce consumption and get paid for it.32 FERC 
                                                
 28 Seven regional grid operators operate markets and “serve over one-half of 
the nation and provide two-thirds of the nation’s electricity.” Joel B. Eisen, 
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1783, 1793 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to 
Transform the Electric Grid]. The wholesale markets are described in depth in 
Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the 
Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016). For purposes of this Article, there is 
no practical difference between ISOs and RTOs, and the term “RTOs” will be 
used to refer to grid operators generally. Grid operator names including “ISO,” 
such as “New York ISO,” will also be used. 
 29 See Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 74. 
 30 See DAVID KATHAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, 
POLICY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ISO DEMAND RESPONSE 
PROGRAMS 48 (2002). 
 31 Id. 
 32 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 17. 
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defines demand response as: “Changes in electric usage by 
demand-side resources from their normal consumption patterns in 
response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to 
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at 
times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is 
jeopardized.”33 You, the consumer, are “responding”: changing 
your electricity consumption. There is considerable debate, by the 
way, about whether you are temporarily doing so, that is, simply 
“time shifting” your usage to a different time of day, or actually 
conserving electricity.34 
There are considerable differences among demand response 
programs. What you are responding to can take one of two 
different forms. In “emergency” programs, the grid needs you to 
reduce demand because it is too stressed: an emergency (supply 
constraint or high prices) requires immediate cutbacks.35 In 
“economic” programs, you participate voluntarily to receive 
payments in the markets. How you respond can differ, too: your 
reduction can be mandatory or voluntary. In a direct load control 
program, the consumer has agreed in advance to reduce demand if 
the utility determines that a specific triggering event occurs. In an 
aggregator’s economic demand response program, the consumer 
may set a program on a device such as the Nest (these days, often 
with an app of some sort) with settings that accept a request for 
demand reductions sometimes and reject them at others (if, for 
                                                
 33Reports on Demand Response & Advanced Metering, FED. ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/demand-response/dem-res-adv-metering.asp (last updated Feb. 6, 2017). 
 34 This concern has been recognized since the advent of demand-side 
techniques. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., DEMAND RESPONSE: AN INTRODUCTION 1 
(2006), 
http://www.swenergy.org/data/sites/1/media/documents/publications/documents/
Demand_Response_White_Paper.pdf (“For example, a large customer may 
switch from grid-supplied electricity to backup generators, when called to do so 
by the utility.”); Steven Nadel & Howard Geller, Utility DSM: What have we 
learned? Where are we going?, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 289, 294 (1996) (“Load 
management programmes shift electric loads from one period to another 
(typically from peak to off-peak periods) but generally do not reduce electricity 
use.”). 
 35 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 9. 
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example, the temperature rises above a set point). The incentive for 
reducing demand can be a flat payment, a reduced electricity rate, 
or something else, perhaps an agreement with an aggregator to be 
paid whenever you reduce demand. Demand response programs 
differ on other variables, too. As discussed below, programs vary 
based on who controls the demand reduction (a utility, aggregator, 
or grid operator), which types of customers are involved 
(residential or commercial and industrial customers36), and how 
quick the response is expected.37 
Most discussions group this bewildering variety of techniques 
into a few broad categories for simplicity’s sake.38 It is common to 
separate dynamic pricing and incentive-based programs.39 Of 
course, dynamic pricing builds in an “incentive” for reductions—if 
you use less, you pay less—but the industry convention is to use 
“incentive-based” to refer to other programs.40 This Article uses a 
                                                
 36 This distinction matters because commercial and industrial customers have 
typically been more likely to have access to relevant technologies and, therefore, 
have historically accounted for the lion’s share of demand response to date. U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 17 (“The decision-making process may be 
somewhat different for residential and small commercial customers, who may 
have a less formalized notion of their usage needs and budget than for large 
commercial or industrial facilities that may include energy costs as part of a 
specific operating budget.”). 
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 15 (“Demand response options can 
be deployed at all timescales of electricity system management . . . and can be 
coordinated with the pricing and commitment mechanisms appropriate for the 
timescale of their commitment or dispatch.”). 
 38 See id. at xii. For a slightly different taxonomy, see STEVEN D. BRAITHWAIT 
& KELLY EAKIN, EDISON ELEC. INST., THE ROLE OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN 
ELECTRIC POWER MARKET DESIGN 2 (2002) (“The report groups demand 
response mechanisms into three generic categories–dynamic pricing, 
interruptible and voluntary load reductions, and customer provision of ancillary 
services. We focus primarily on markets for energy, rather than ancillary 
services, and draw distinctions among three types of the second category of load 
reduction programs: traditional load management programs, utility energy buy-
back programs, and ISO/RTO sponsored demand bidding programs.”). 
 39 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xii; FERC DR-AM 2016, 
supra note 22, at 19 n.85 (“Incentive-based demand response programs include 
direct load control, interruptible, demand bidding/buyback, emergency demand 
response, capacity market, and ancillary service market programs.”). 
 40 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xii. 
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simplified terminology to further subdivide incentive-based 
programs between those conducted by utilities and by the 
wholesale markets, to recognize an important distinction between 
the two—the former are administered by the states and the latter by 
RTOs41—and to spotlight two distinctly different market 
opportunities for demand response: the wholesale markets and 
potential new markets to be administered by utilities at the state 
level. 
I use “utility demand management” to refer to utility-based 
programs. In the 1970s, “load management” encompassed 
techniques available to a utility to reduce demand, that is, 
interruptible rates and DLC.42 Today, utilities administer these and 
other more sophisticated programs. Somewhat confusingly, some 
today refer to all demand response as load management because 
that is what it does: manage “load” (the industry word for 
demand).43 I use “demand management” to refer to all utility 
demand response programs, including those that might be more 
interactive than traditional load management, and I distinguish 
these from “wholesale market programs.” 
From the beginning, demand response has included all three 
categories—dynamic pricing, utility demand management, and 
wholesale market programs—even though they differ considerably 
from one another in design and function. Energy efficiency 
measures, while also aimed at reducing electricity consumption, 
are not included. This recognizes that some demand-side measures 
can give grid operators flexibility to achieve balance between 
supply and demand, but others cannot. Energy efficiency does not 
produce the sort of immediate demand reductions a market needs.44 
                                                
 41 See, e.g., Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,660 (“While a number of states and 
utilities are pursuing retail-level price-responsive demand initiatives based on 
dynamic and time-differentiated retail prices and utility investments in demand 
response enabling technologies, these are state efforts, and, thus, are not the 
subject of this proceeding.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 294. 
 43 See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 34, at 1. 
 44 See CHARLES GOLDMAN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
COORDINATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
AND DEMAND RESPONSE ES-1 (2010), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/report-
lbnl-3044e.pdf. 
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There is a potentially complementary relationship between the two, 
although they are provided and measured differently so 
coordination is necessary to achieve maximum co-benefits.45 If you 
add insulation to your house to improve its efficiency, for example, 
your home’s improved performance might make you more willing 
to respond to a call to cut consumption immediately.46 But merely 
installing the insulation would not affect supply and demand in a 
wholesale market right now. 
B. Demand Response’s Benefits For The Electric Grid 
Demand response is a helping hand when the grid needs it. 
Think of it as the grid’s WD-40: put some here, a little there, and 
things work better. In its WD-40 role, demand response is valuable 
in many different ways to the grid.47 You might shift electricity use 
to non-peak hours, eliminating the need for power plants to start 
during the small number of hours that demand peaks each year. 
When you choose to respond to higher prices and reduce demand, 
this may result in reduced marginal costs of electricity because 
higher-cost plants would not be “dispatched” (sent by the system 
operator to meet demand). Demand response programs may also 
lead to reductions in usage if peak consumption is eliminated 
rather than shifted, so it matters how you respond; if commercial 
and industrial customers start polluting “behind the meter” 
generators, this negates the benefits.48 
Looking prospectively, demand response programs can help 
meet future anticipated demand and avoid the unnecessary expense 
of building new power plants. Demand “peakedness” requires grid 
operators to have power plants on hand to meet peak demand, 
which leads to oversupply of generating capacity that demand 
response can help ameliorate. RTOs increasingly rely on regional 
                                                
 45 See generally Steven Nadel, Demand Response Programs Can Reduce 
Utilities’ Peak Demand an Average of 10%, Complementing Savings from 
Energy Efficiency Programs, ACEEE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:58 PM), 
http://aceee.org/blog/2017/02/demand-response-programs-can-reduce. 
 46 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 8. 
 47 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21 (discussing demand 
response’s many benefits). 
 48 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 40. 
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planning processes and capacity mechanisms49 to decide whether 
new power plants are needed. Factoring demand response into 
these models can lead to construction of fewer new plants. 
Demand response can also help to provide ancillary services. 
These are special services that keep the grid in balance, such as 
reserves to provide power on short notice, where demand response 
can substitute for power plants that run offline. And demand 
response bids into wholesale markets compete with those of 
generators and can help mitigate their market power.50 
Finally, demand response is an important element of the 
transition to a clean energy economy. It increases grid reliability 
when used as a balancing resource for wind and solar power.51 As 
more distributed energy resources are integrated to the grid, 
demand response will be more useful in stabilizing it. The 
“distinctive characteristics” of distributed energy resources 
“highlight the importance of facilitating programs and technologies 
like demand response and energy storage to help manage steep 
generation ramping needs to meet net electricity load.”52 
So it is good to have more of this WD-40 around. That is great, 
but far from the final word. Demand response is hardly anyone’s 
idea of the most exciting resource in a transformed electric grid. It 
is not “clean energy” (being not energy at all), or a splashy new 
thing that people want, like an electric vehicle that goes 300 miles 
on one charge or a Tesla Powerwall that can store all your 
homemade power. As I have said before, no one is stampeding an 
Apple store at midnight to buy smart thermostats.53 It is just eating 
                                                
 49 An example of a capacity market is PJM’s “Reliability Pricing Model.” See 
infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text. 
 50 DOUG HURLEY ET AL., REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, DEMAND 
RESPONSE AS A POWER SYSTEM RESOURCE: PROGRAM DESIGNS, PERFORMANCE, 
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2013). 
 51 Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, Virtual Power Plants, and the 
Smart Grid, 7 U. HOUS. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. AND POL’Y J. 191, 201–05 (2012) 
[hereinafter Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources]. 
 52 FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 23; Schare & Feldman, supra note 
13. 
 53 Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and 
Federalism for the Smart Grid]. Sales of all smart thermostats are growing, but 
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your spinach, so to speak, but getting paid for it. And more people 
prefer chocolate to spinach. 
Thus, demand response’s beneficial role in the grid does not 
come close to telling the full story of how it came to be at the 
center of today’s grid modernization efforts. If everyone in the 
industry had recognized its importance from the start, no policies 
would have been needed to encourage it. But that was not the case. 
So, to begin to understand demand response’s importance, we need 
to go back to the 1970s, when it was hardly anything at all. 
II. DEMAND RESPONSE 1.0: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
“DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT” 
The path of demand-side participation in the grid has not been 
a linear upward trajectory. This Part discusses the first generation 
of demand-side participation in the grid, spanning from the 1970s 
to early 2000s. “Demand-side management” (“DSM”), the 
umbrella term for all demand-side measures, began modestly in the 
1970s, had its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s, and fell off 
significantly during the move to retail competition in the electric 
industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to recover somewhat 
later. As discussed more fully in Part III, “demand response” arose 
in the early 2000s after the fall off in demand-side measures 
contributed to a catastrophe in California. 
But before this, there was little to no demand response for 
many decades in the electricity industry. 
A. Demand Response “0.0”: Little Demand-Side Participation 
Like much of contemporary energy law and policy, demand-
side measures have their origins in the energy crises of the 1970s. 
Think of the era before then as “demand response 0.0.” There was 
“little urgency”54 for measures to reduce consumer electricity 
                                                                                                         
Nest itself is struggling. Mark Bergen, With $340 Million in Revenue, Nest is 
Underperforming, and its Future at Google is at Risk, RECODE.NET (Mar 30, 
2016, 5:19 PM EDT), http://www.recode.net/2016/3/30/11587388/nest-2015-
sales-budget. 
 54 STEVEN BRAITHWAIT ET AL., EDISON ELEC. INST., RETAIL ELECTRICITY 
PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING MARKETS 43 (2007), 
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demand. Utilities considered the idea of paying their customers to 
cut back their consumption to be preposterous.55 They did not need 
to. Costs of generating electricity were low, and going lower all the 
time as improving economies of scale made it cheaper to build new 
plants and generate more electricity. Postwar prosperity brought 
the convenience of the “all-electric home.” The “Live Better 
Electrically” campaign that promoted it, with then-actor Ronald 
Reagan as its notable spokesman, was “[o]ne of the most effective 
mass marketing home campaigns of all time.”56 The industry 
mascot Reddy Kilowatt promoted more uses of electricity.57 The 
California utility PG&E had this pithy slogan: “Don’t Be A 
Dishwasher, Buy One.”58 
It was an era of coziness between PUCs and the (mostly) 
vertically integrated utility companies that they regulated. Cost-of-
service ratemaking’s familiar “throughput incentive”59 encouraged 
capital spending on new power plants, as costs incurred could be 
recovered from ratepayers with relatively few limitations. There 
was no incentive to reduce demand, which would reduce profits.60 
Utilities sold power, and their customers bought it. As late as 1981, 
                                                                                                         
http://eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/Retail_Electricity_Pric
ing.pdf. 
 55 BRETT D. STEELE & THEO BREITENSTEIN, THE HISTORY AND EVOLVEMENT 
OF ELECTRICAL PEAK LOAD CONTROL SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. 2 
(2010), 
http://emacx.com/documents/TheHistoryandEvolvementofElectricalPeakLoadC
ontrolSystems_002.pdf (terming this notion “absurd”). 
 56 Live Better Electrically: The Gold Medallion Home Campaign, WASH. 
DEP’T OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND HISTORY PRES., http://www.dahp.wa.gov/live-
better-electrically-the-gold-medallion-electric-home-campaign (last visited Mar. 
14, 2017). 
 57 About Reddy Kilowatt, REDDYKILOWATT.ORG, 
http://www.reddykilowatt.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 58 Stephen P. Reynolds & Jane F. Christopherson, Public Policy and Price Per 
kWh, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 83, 84 (1984). 
 59 Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
 60 JOSEPH ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE OF U.S. UTILITY DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 4–5 (1996), 
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/39931.pdf; STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra 
note 55, at 2. 
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Clark Gellings, one of the originators of the term “DSM,” 
described venturing behind a customer’s electric meter as going 
into “forbidden territory.”61 
Even though they were shunned, strategies to reduce electricity 
demand did exist. Decades earlier, “engineers and utilities debated 
alternative pricing regimes that included charges at times of high 
demand and time-of-day differentiated rates.”62 Basic demand-side 
measures were around, if not used widely. As the noted industry 
analyst Ahmad Faruqui put it, “[d]irect load control of certain 
residential appliances such as water heaters and air conditioners 
and interruptible and curtailable rates for commercial and 
industrial customers” existed before 1970.63 In 1968, Detroit 
Edison started the first DLC program.64 
But measures to reduce demand were not more widely adopted, 
because utilities were largely uninterested in them. For quite a few 
utilities, that antipathy65 persists to this day and informs 
discussions about demand response. 
                                                
 61 Shmuel S. Oren, Demand Response: An Historical Perspective and 
Business Models for Load Control Aggregation, Feb. 1, 2010, at slide 5 (citing 
Clark W. Gellings, Demand-side Load Management: The Rising Cost of Peak-
Demand Power Means that Utilities Must Encourage Customers to Manage 
Power Usage, 18 IEEE SPECTRUM 49 (Dec. 1981)). 
 62 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INCORPORATING RENEWABLES INTO THE 
ELECTRIC GRID 26–27 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160616_ce
a_renewables_electricgrid.pdf. 





 64 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE 
AND ADVANCED METERING 23 n.26 (2011), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2010-dr-report.pdf [hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2010]. 
 65 STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra note 55, at 3 (noting “hostile utility 
industry attitudes towards conservation and load curtailment [that] slowly 
started to change” in the 1970s). 
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B. The 1970s and 1980s: Reducing Demand Becomes More 
Common 
In the 1970s, outright hostility to demand-side measures 
softened when three significant trends coincided and changed the 
future of demand-side participation in the grid. Since then, federal 
and state programs and initiatives have encouraged reduced 
electricity consumption and improved energy efficiency. 
1. Three Trends Catalyze Attention to the Demand Side 
The rapid growth of residential air conditioning, beginning in 
the mid-1950s and accelerating into the 1970s and 1980s,66 
changed the demand curve for utilities.67 They now had peaks in 
demand during the middle of the day and needed extra power 
plants to meet that peak demand. These extra “peaking” plants 
would not be used for the rest of the year.68 It made sense to find 
some way to shift usage outside the utility’s peak hours, to reduce 
costs and the need for new plants. 
Also, the cost of both fuel and new power plants escalated. In 
the mid- to late-1970s and early 1980s, building new power plants 
(particularly nuclear plants) became more expensive.69 The 
unexpected high costs of nuclear plants, combined with the 
growing societal awareness of the impacts of nuclear power 
generation and opposition to new plants, led to plant cancellations 
and adverse impacts on utility profitability.70 After the Arab oil 
                                                
 66 MAXIMILIAN AUFFHAMMER, REPORT #3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR 
CONDITIONING ADOPTION AND TEMPERATURE 3 (2011), 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0573-01.pdf/$file/EE-0573-
01.pdf (noting that “in 1955 the residential air conditioner penetration in the 
United States was below 2% nationally” but “[a] quarter of a century later that 
fraction had risen to 50%, with half of those households having installed central 
air-conditioning units.”); Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 393 
(“Nationally, the presence of air conditioning in new single-family homes 
increased from 49% in 1973 to 89% in 2006.”). 
 67 Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 393. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See, e.g., Reynolds & Christopherson, supra note 58, at 85–86 (detailing 
cost increases for the California utility PG&E). 
 70 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Jersey Central Power & Light Co v Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission: Robert Bork on Public Utility Rate 
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embargo of 1973, fuel prices went up and so too did electricity 
prices,71 which, to an extent not seen before, prompted new 
attention to “energy independence” and caused customers to cut 
back on their demand.72 
In addition, the burgeoning environmental movement brought 
increasing attention to the externalities of electricity generation. 
The rise of environmentalism brought more participation and 
contention to ratemaking proceedings,73 and promoted a new ethic 
of using less instead of building more. Cutting consumption 
became virtuous. President Jimmy Carter wore a sweater in the 
White House and urged Americans to conserve energy.74 And there 
was increasing academic interest in an electricity future that was 
not all about Reddy Kilowatt. In 1978, MIT Professor Fred 
Schweppe described a “homeostatic” electric grid in which supply 
and demand balanced at equilibrium.75 Schweppe and other 
scholars saw a future in which both supply (power plants) and 
cutting back demand contributed to this balance. He proposed the 
use of price signals, market mechanisms, and communication 
technologies to prompt cuts in demand when necessary to achieve 
this balance.76 
                                                                                                         
Regulation—and Lochner v New York, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 193 
(2013). 
 71 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES OF ELECTRICITY, 
1960-2011, 
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0810 (showing 
increases in nominal electricity prices in the 1970s after stable prices had 
prevailed before then). 
 72 RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 126–27 (1989). 
 73 See, e.g., Reynolds & Christopherson, supra note 58, at 88 (listing ten 
groups “to name only a few” that had “sprung up” to intervene in utility 
proceedings in California). 
 74 Peter Dykstra, President Jimmy Carter Tried to Change the Path of 
America’s Energy Future with His ‘Crisis of Confidence’ Speech, Delivered 35 
Years Ago Monday. Here’s Why it Didn’t Work, THE DAILY CLIMATE (July 15, 
2014), http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2014/07/carter-crisis-speech-
anniversary (describing the “crisis of confidence” speech). 
 75 MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 35. 
 76 Id. 
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For most of the 1970s, however, demand-side programs could 
best be described as “modest.”77 In 1979, less than 30 percent of 
investor-owned utilities had interruptible rate programs.78 And 
there was a “wink wink agreement”79 that utilities would not 
interrupt their customers,80 so these programs merely established a 
lower default rate for commercial and industrial customers that 
demanded these rates for continuing to purchase power.81 Dynamic 
pricing experiments began in several utilities in the mid-1970s.82 In 
1975, the Federal Energy Administration, the forerunner of the 
DOE, conducted sixteen rate demonstration projects.83 It was not 
until the 1980s, though, that any utility would start a dynamic 
pricing program in earnest. 
2. PURPA and the Growth of DSM 
During the 1970s, federal statutes established a national policy 
of encouraging efficiency and conservation, and prodded utilities 
into action. The core statute involving utilities was the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).84 Utilities 
began to seriously conduct DSM programs by the end of the 
decade,85 as state PUCs acted to empower electric utilities to 
recover costs associated with DSM programs in keeping with 
PURPA’s mandate encouraging DSM investments. A significant 
                                                
 77 ETO, supra note 60, at vii. 
 78 Caves et al., supra note 15, at 51 (discussing a 1987 study by the Electric 
Power Research Institute). 
 79 STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 31 (2015). 
 80 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 19; DANIEL F. KOHLER & BRIDGER M. 
MITCHELL, RESPONSE TO RESIDENTIAL TIME-OF-USE ELECTRICITY RATES 6 
(1983) (citing a report by the Peak Load Management Alliance observing that, 
“[M]any utilities rarely if ever interrupted these customers. So with the rate 
discount, such programs evolved more for purposes of economic development 
than for load management.”). 
 81 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 12. 
 82 KOHLER & MITCHELL, supra note 80, at v. 
 83 See id. (discussing the results from several of these projects). 
 84 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617 (1978) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)) [hereinafter PURPA]. 
 85 Eric Hirst et al., The Future of DSM in a Restructured U.S. Electricity 
Industry, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 303, 303 (1996). 
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number of utilities adopted programs with measures to encourage 
customers to reduce electricity usage through improvements to 
efficiency and increased conservation.86 
PURPA’s demand-side provisions, set forth in Title I, aimed to 
encourage conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities, 
optimal efficiency of electric utility facilities and resources, and 
equitable rates for electric consumers. PURPA did not mandate 
that utilities undertake specific actions but instead encouraged the 
states to adopt regulatory policies.87 It set forth six specific federal 
standards for utilities’ services and rates: (i) rates should reflect the 
actual cost of electric power generation and distribution; (ii) rates 
should not decline with increases in electric power use unless the 
cost of providing the power decreases as consumption increases; 
(iii) rates should reflect the daily variations in the actual cost of 
electric power generation; (iv) rates should reflect the seasonal 
variations in the actual cost of electric power generation; (v) rates 
should offer a special “interruptible” electric power service rate for 
commercial and industrial customers; and (vi) each electric utility 
must offer load management techniques to their electric consumers 
that will be practicable, cost effective and reliable, as determined 
by the state public utility commission.88 State PUCs were required 
to consider whether adopting these standards would further 
PURPA’s objectives. 
“Demand‑side management” emerged in the early 1980s as the 
umbrella term for energy efficiency, conservation programs, and 
initiatives aimed at reducing electricity demand.89 Broadly 
speaking, DSM programs can be divided into seven categories: (1) 
information provision; (2) technical strategies such as energy 
audits; (3) financial assistance for adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies; (4) “direct or free installation of energy-efficient 
technologies;” (5) performance contracting, “in which a third party 
contracts with both the utility and a customer and guarantees 
                                                
 86 Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 291–94 (describing typical programs). 
 87 PURPA § 111. 
 88 PURPA § 111(d)(1)–(6). 
 89 As Ahmad Faruqui notes, the “DSM” term was invented in 1983 at an 
industry workshop. Faruqui, supra note 63, at 8. 
376 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
energy performance”; (6) load management; and (7) dynamic 
pricing.90 Thus, although they sound similar, “demand-side 
management” and “demand response” are different, as the latter 
encompasses only the last two on this list. 
Another federal statute promoting DSM was the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992 (“EPAct 1992”), which encouraged “integrated 
resource planning” (“IRP”). IRP has two components: an 
assessment of future electric needs, and a plan to meet the 
projected future needs. It is “integrated” because it evaluates both 
traditional supply side resources (building new power plants and 
transmission lines) and demand-side resources (energy efficiency 
and demand response) in making decisions about how best to meet 
projected future electric energy needs.91 By explicitly adding 
consideration of demand-side resources to utility planning, IRP 
aimed to change the traditional pattern of building more supply to 
meet projected demand. EPAct 1992 amended PURPA to add three 
new standards for state consideration, two of which were the use of 
IRP and the encouragement of DSM investments by making them 
as profitable as supply-side investments.92 This latter statutory 
standard requires that state regulators link a utility’s rates and 
recovery of its costs to its performance in implementing cost-
effective DSM programs.93 Spurred by the statutory requirement, a 
number of state PUCs adopted IRP to modify the process of 
regulating the supply of electricity provided by electric utilities.94 
DSM programs grew rapidly in the 1980s, as state regulators 
responded to the PURPA mandate and provided incentives for 
utilities. A 1982 survey found a “virtual stampede,” as 72 percent 
of U.S. utilities had conservation programs and two-thirds had load 
                                                
 90 ETO, supra note 60, at 2. 
 91 RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, 
BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 2 
(2013), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapse-
wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf. 
 92 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 115, 106 Stat. 2776, 
2803 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(8) (2012)). 
 93 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(8). 
 94 WILSON & BIEWALD, supra 91, at 3. 
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management programs;95 half had been established since 1980.96 
By 1993, electric utility DSM programs reached $2.7 billion of 
utility spending, or about one percent of U.S. utility revenues.97 
Notably lagging, however, were dynamic pricing programs. 
California’s utility PG&E started a real-time pricing program in 
the mid-1980s,98 which was largely unsuccessful due to its design. 
Two other utilities (Niagara Mohawk and Georgia Power) started 
more robust programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.99 Even 
today, only a few dynamic pricing programs are successful.100 
Overall, little progress has been made in signing up residential 
customers.101 
3. The Decline of DSM In Restructuring 
Demand-side programs experienced a sharp reversal of fortune 
when program mandates were swept away in the late 1990s. The 
chief culprit was the introduction of partial competition into the 
utility industry, known as “restructuring.”102 Restructuring was 
prompted by advances in technology, regulatory initiatives 
promoting competition in the industry,103 the emergence of new, 
nonutility (or “merchant”) generators, and societal and economic 
arguments for ending utilities’ monopolies, at least for electricity 
                                                
 95 CHRISTOPHER FLAVIN, WORLDWATCH INST., ELECTRICITY’S FUTURE: THE 
SHIFT TO EFFICIENCY AND SMALL-SCALE POWER 85 (1984); see also 
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 394 (describing the rise of load 
management programs in the mid 1980s and early 1990s). 
 96 FLAVIN, supra note 95, at 85. 
 97 ETO, supra note 60, at vii. 
 98 BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 44. 
 99 Id. 
 100 DAN YORK & MARTIN KUSHLER, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECON., EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMAND RESPONSE 
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY iv (2005) (observing that, “With a few noteworthy 
exceptions, only a few [dynamic pricing programs] have achieved significant 
absolute or relative impacts in terms of load reductions achieved.”). 
 101 Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential 
Dynamic Electricity Pricing 1 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 18037, 2012). 
 102 ETO, supra note 60, at 1. 
 103 See generally ISSER, supra note 79, at 152–207; Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory 
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric 
Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 549–51 (2005). 
378 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
generation. The story of retail and wholesale restructuring has been 
studied extensively,104 and I will not repeat it here. Retail choice 
had incomplete success and outright failure in some states, which 
led to a balkanized system today where some states enable 
customers to choose their electricity generator, but most do not.105 
The fate of DSM programs during this time period is also well 
known. Proponents feared that the programs would suffer the ax in 
a more competitive environment.106 If utilities were required to pay 
for them, and their upstart competitors were not, price-elastic 
customers would presumably switch,107 so utilities argued that they 
should not bear the programs’ costs.108 The result was predictable. 
Spending on utility DSM peaked in the early 1990s,109 but after 
that, utility support waned, and total spending on DSM programs 
declined by almost half between 1993 and 2001.110 States repealed 
                                                
 104 ISSER, supra note 79, at 233–74, for example, evaluates the rise and fall of 
competition in California. See also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage 
Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 779–81 (2008). 
 105 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING BY 
STATE, 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 106 Hirst et al., supra note 85, at 304. 
 107 Id. at 305; ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR 
ELECTRIC ENERGY, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1815 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 
2005 97 (2006) (observing that this was particularly true when distribution 
utilities were required under restructuring laws to maintain “provider of last 
resort” offerings to ensure service to all customers). 
 108 See ISSER, supra note 79, at 192; Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 290. 
 109 See Hirst et al., supra note 85, at 304. 
 110 RICHARD COWART, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, EFFICIENT 
RELIABILITY: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF DEMAND-SIDE RESOURCES IN POWER 
SYSTEMS AND MARKETS v–vi (2001). Meanwhile, unfortunately, the 
contribution of utility-sponsored demand-side management programs (DSM) to 
meeting the nation’s load growth needs has been in decline. In the early 1990’s, 
utility DSM programs saved a total of 29,000 MW at a cost of about three cents 
per kWh saved. Despite this generally solid record of success, since the passage 
of the Energy Policy Act and the national move to retail electric competition, 
utility-sponsored DSM programs have been cut back sharply. Total utility DSM 
spending has declined by about fifty percent since 1993. 
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IRP requirements.111 The federal government’s treasure trove of 
energy data, the Energy Information Administration, stopped 
keeping track of DSM spending after 2001.112 
The decline of DSM illustrates how opponents of demand-side 
programs can modify their arguments to suit the times. DSM 
spending cratered because it was a burden to utilities that hobbled 
their ability to compete with market entrants who were not 
required to carry out these programs. It was the advent of 
competition, not DSM’s inherent merits, which prompted the 
decline. 
III. DEMAND RESPONSE 2.0: THE ADVENT AND GROWTH OF 
“DEMAND RESPONSE” 
This Part begins with yet another reversal, this time in the 
opposite direction: the growth of demand response programs in 
wholesale electricity markets after the California electricity crisis 
of 2000-2001. Since then, wholesale market programs have 
evolved, and FERC Orders have attempted to put demand response 
on a comparable footing with generation in these markets,113 yet 
barriers to demand response participation persist. 
Just as utility DSM spending was dropping off, events in 
California intervened. The state’s electricity crisis was centered on 
the aborted move to electricity competition. There were numerous 
                                                                                                         
As one example of this trend, New York utilities’ energy efficiency spending 
“was cut by about 75% in the mid-1990’s.” Id. at 15; cf. Wellinghoff & 
Morenoff, supra note 18 (demand reduction programs also “dropped off”). 
 111 WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 91, at 3. 
 112 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC UTILITY DEMAND SIDE 
MANAGEMENT - ARCHIVE, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/dsm/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2017). 
 113 As noted throughout this Article, demand response cannot receive the 
exact same treatment as electricity generated from power plants, because it 
involves different kinds of resources. Regulatory treatment that attempts to 
achieve comparability often results in different market rules for the two types of 
resources. Infra Part III; for a specific recent example, see Indep. Mkt. Monitor 
for PJM v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61,059 (Apr. 21, 2016) 
(denying a Market Monitor’s complaint, and upholding different offer caps for 
generation and demand response), https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-
meet/2016/042116/E-5.pdf. 
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structural problems with California’s design for retail competition, 
resulting in tremendous economic pressure on both consumers and 
the state’s utilities.114 One of the many problems was a disconnect 
between wholesale and retail energy markets. When prices in the 
state’s new wholesale electricity market spiked as a result of a 
confluence of factors that some called a perfect storm,115 there was 
no safety valve. Dynamic pricing, then as now, was not 
widespread,116 so retail customers paid fixed rates117 that could not 
be easily adjusted upward to relieve the price squeeze. 
There was no other effective form of demand reductions to 
relieve market pressure.118 At the time, all three of California’s 
major investor-owned utilities had interruptible rate programs, but 
they had rarely been used.119 This situation changed dramatically 
during the crisis. Utilities issued more frequent calls to reduce 
demand from interruptible customers.120 The number escalated into 
2000,121 when power prices spiked. Customers refused these 
demands and then balked at paying penalties imposed on them for 
refusing.122 
A. The Ascent of “Demand Response” 
As was noted at the time, “Competitive wholesale markets . . . 
resemble the sound of one hand clapping. They are often 
                                                
 114 For a detailed discussion of this, see ISSER, supra note 79, at 233–74. See 
also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In 
2000, wholesale prices for electricity in California increased dramatically and 
resulted in the now-infamous California energy crisis.”). 
 115 ISSER, supra note 79, at 233. The factors included high demand, market 
manipulation, and, as discussed infra, the lack of effective demand response. 
 116 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, LOAD AS A RELIABILITY RESOURCE IN 
RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 32 (2003). 
 117 BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 5. 
 118 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 116, at 32. 
 119 Id. As Isser observes, demand response programs were created during the 
crisis, but did not blunt the impacts of the shortages. See ISSER, supra note 79, at 
254. 
 120 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 116, at 32. 
 121 The programs were called five, two, and thirteen times in 1998, 1999, and 
2000, respectively. Id. 
 122 See HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21; see also CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
supra note 116, at 28; STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra note 55, at 4. 
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inefficient and not fully competitive, in part because retail-
customer loads do not participate in these markets.”123 Studies 
demonstrated this, showing that a small amount of grid WD-40 
would have reduced California’s spiking wholesale prices 
considerably.124 The availability of real-time pricing for 
commercial and industrial customers could have reduced peak 
demand in California by 2.5% and wholesale market prices by 
24%.125 Another report estimated that if demand could have been 
reduced by 5% it would have cut wholesale prices in half.126 
In the early 2000s, at roughly the same time as California’s 
market was melting down, the nation’s grid operators and their 
wholesale markets were rapidly emerging.127 With the advent of the 
wholesale markets, the goals of demand-side programs needed to 
shift.128 The urge to avoid repeating the California debacle led to a 
“near-universal” sentiment that wholesale markets needed some 
                                                
 123 Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 391 (quoting HIRST & KIRBY, 
infra note 126, at v). 
 124 Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 395 (quoting BRAITHWAIT & 
EAKIN, supra note 38) (“[E]ven modest amounts of demand response can lead to 
significant reductions in wholesale prices at times of capacity constraints.”). 
 125 Steven Braithwait & Ahmad Faruqui, The Choice Not to Buy: Energy 
Savings and Policy Alternatives for Demand Response, 139 No. 6 PUB. UTIL. 
FORTNIGHTLY 48, 53 (Mar. 15, 2001). 
 126 ERIC HIRST & BRENDAN KIRBY, EDISON ELEC. INST., RETAIL-LOAD 
PARTICIPATION IN COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS v fig. S-1 
(2001); cf. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 395–96 (noting that 
President Gordon van Welie observed that cutting demand five percent in ISO-
New England would save $580 million annually). 
 127 ISSER, supra note 79, at 208–16. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
Interconnection (“PJM”), for example, became an ISO in 1997 and an RTO in 
2002. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,257 (1997), order on rehr’g and clarification, 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,282 (2000); 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 101 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,345 (2002). 
 128 Steven M. Brown, DSM/Load Management Evolves into Demand 
Response, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (Mar. 1, 2002), 
http://www.elp.com/articles/powergrid_international/print/volume-7/issue-
2/features/dsm-load-management-evolves-into-demand-response.html (noting 
that “many view demand response as the new, possibly more politically correct 
name for demand side management,” while acknowledging and describing its 
differences). 
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form of demand-side participation;129 that was “undeniable.”130 
“Demand response” emerged as the umbrella term for techniques 
using demand reductions to balance supply and demand in 
wholesale markets131 or balance a utility’s system, referring to “all 
customer changes in actions or behaviors that introduce price 
elasticity into the wholesale market or that can be used to increase 
system reliability.”132 In part, this was also a re-branding. Being 
mandated to do DSM programs was not something utilities wanted 
to hear in 2002.133 
This inflection point in the industry’s transformation marked 
the first uses of the term “demand response.” By summer 2001, 
four grid operators had demand response programs.134 Reports 
from 2001 and 2002135 evaluated demand response’s value to 
markets. FERC and the DOE held a “Demand Response 
Conference” in 2002, and also in 2002, FERC stated that the 
“Standard Market Design” (SMD)—a bold attempt to standardize 
the wholesale markets136—would include a starring role for 
demand response. “Demand response,” FERC observed in its 
working paper that evolved into the proposal, “is essential in 
                                                
 129 BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 2; cf. MICHAEL PANFIL & JAMES 
FINE, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, PUTTING DEMAND RESPONSE TO WORK FOR 
CALIFORNIA 7 (2015) (observing that demand response was “conceived as a 
power system resource to provide emergency response and peak load 
management during California’s energy crisis”). 
 130 Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 402. 
 131 Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 11 (observing in 2009 that, “demand 
response has represented a specific paradigm for integrating the consumption 
decisions of certain types of customers into wholesale electricity markets. This 
paradigm involves identifying a potential reduction in consumption and treating 
that reduction as the service provided.”). 
 132 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 133 Schare & Feldman, supra note 13. 
 134 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 3. 
 135 Id. at 8 (discussing a 2002 report of the Peak Load Management Alliance 
on demand response); see also Braithwait & Faruqui, supra note 125. Faruqui, 
supra note 63, at 12 refers to this as the origin of the “second generation” of 
DSM as will this Article. 
 136 The SMD rulemaking proposal was Remedying Undue Discrimination 
Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market 
Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,451 (Oct. 15, 2002). ISSER, supra note 79, at 326–28 
(discussing SMD’s features and development). 
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competitive markets to assure the efficient interaction of supply 
and demand.”137 But SMD met its Waterloo soon thereafter for a 
host of reasons mostly unrelated to demand response.138 
Introducing and encouraging demand response would be left to 
individual grid operators. 
B. Evolution of Wholesale Market Programs (2001-2009) 
Throughout the 2000s, the RTOs evolved frameworks to 
govern the treatment of demand response in their wholesale 
markets, which was complicated by several factors, including that 
the markets had been established and designed for purchases and 
sales of large blocks of power. As barriers to demand response 
participation persisted, Congress and FERC acted to address them, 
with FERC requiring RTOs to reshape their programs to 
accommodate demand response. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs entered 
the picture and the role of aggregation grew, with new firms 
providing demand response to individual utilities and to the 
wholesale markets as intermediaries.139 
                                                
 137 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Standardized Transmission Service and 
Wholesale Electric Market Design 6 (Mar. 15, 2002) (working paper); cf. 
NSTAR Servs. Co., 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,065 (2000) (showing awareness, two years 
earlier, of the adverse impacts of the “lack of demand responsiveness” in the 
ISO-New England markets, in an order imposing a bid cap). With numerous 
references to how grid operators would change their rules to incorporate demand 
response, the proposal made clear that FERC intended to set the “right pricing 
signals for investment in transmission and generation facilities, as well as 
investment in demand reduction” with markets that “treat demand resources on 
an equal footing with supply.” Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open 
Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 55,452 paras. 3, 15 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
(emphasis added); see also BRAITHWAIT & EAKIN, supra note 38, at 1 (noting 
that the SMD proposal determined that, “the issue is not whether demand 
response should play a role in market design, but how to incorporate demand 
response into the standard market design on an equal footing with generation 
resources in order to achieve effective market performance.”); KATHAN, supra 
note 30, at 8. 
 138 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTRICITY MARKETS: CONSUMERS 
COULD BENEFIT FROM DEMAND PROGRAMS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 3 
(2004); see also ISSER, supra note 79, at 327–28 (discussing the “widespread 
backlash” against the SMD proposal). 
 139 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21. 
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Some caveats are needed to better frame this discussion. First, 
we might use the more precise term “demand response in 
organized wholesale energy markets” (as FERC does140) to focus 
on markets administered by RTOs, as bilateral wholesale 
transactions take place outside of these markets.141 For the sake of 
brevity, the remainder of this discussion uses “wholesale markets” 
to mean those conducted by RTOs. Second, a minority of electric 
customers is in areas that do not have these organized markets 
(such as most of North Carolina, for example142) and are served in 
large part by traditional vertically integrated investor-owned 
utilities.143 Some utilities in these areas have adopted demand 
management programs.144 Utility-sponsored demand response can 
                                                
 140 Order 745, supra note 7; cf. HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 24 (making a 
similar distinction). 
 141 ELECTRIC MKTS. RES. FOUND., COMPETITION IN BILATERAL WHOLESALE 
ELECTRIC MARKETS: HOW DOES IT WORK? 3 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2016/Bilateral%20Markets%20White
%20Paper%20Final.pdf. 
 142 Electric Industry, N.C. UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/industries/electric/electric.htm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2017) (NCUC regulates rates of the states’ three investor-owned 
utilities); JONAS MONAST ET AL., ILLUMINATING THE ENERGY POLICY AGENDA: 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR ISSUES FACING THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 2 (2016) 
(showing FERC map of RTO territories with part of eastern North Carolina in 
PJM). 
 143 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xvii (“[D]emand response is 
viewed and evaluated differently in regions with ISO- or RTO-managed 
organized spot markets than in regions with vertically integrated utilities with a 
monopoly franchise. Vertically integrated utilities internalize and pass through 
all of their energy production, transmission and distribution costs, so they (and 
their regulators) take a long-term view and evaluate demand response against 
the alternative of building (or buying) new generation. Thus, utilities with retail 
monopolies evaluate and measure demand response benefits primarily in terms 
of avoided capacity costs over the long run. In contrast, regions with organized 
wholesale markets have active energy trading opportunities with transparent 
market clearing prices (and in four of the seven ISO/RTO regions, no 
comparable capacity market), so they tend to evaluate demand response benefits 
primarily in terms of time-varying energy and capacity values in competitive 
markets. This view frames demand response benefits in the short run, and tends 
to understate long-term benefits.”). 
 144 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. An example is the “Smart Hours” 
program of Oklahoma utility OG&E, https://oge.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
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benefit a utility in numerous ways even where demand reductions 
are not bid into wholesale markets,145 for example, potentially 
allowing deferral of new power plant costs.146 FERC has no 
jurisdiction over these programs.147 
Moreover, in states within grid operators’ footprints, customers 
can take part in wholesale market programs, and in programs 
offered by utilities. There is overlap between the programs, as, for 
example, in regions such as PJM, a utility can use demand 
reductions in the programs it conducts to meet its own 
obligations148 to provide capacity. 
  
                                                
 145 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. 
 146 Katie Fehrenbacher, How Alphabet’s Nest Helps Utilities Cope with 
Summer Heat Waves, FORTUNE (Aug. 29, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/29/alphabet-nest-thermostat-summer/ (describing 
SCE’s strategy of investing in demand response and storage as a result of losing 
a source of fuel to its peaking natural gas plants). 
 147 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. 
 148 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, LOAD MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
REPORT 2009/2010 4 https://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/load-
management-performance-report-2009-2010.ashx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
386 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
 
The following graphic depicts the myriad of entities involved 
in utility demand management and wholesale market programs:149 
 
RTOs administer both emergency and economic demand 
response programs.150 Also, they typically have as many as three 
distinctly different types of wholesale markets, and demand 
response participates differently into each type. These markets are: 
                                                
 149 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 4. A color version of Figure 1 can be 
found online at http://ncjolt.org/.  
 150 Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,660; PETER CAPPERS ET AL., DEMAND 
RESPONSE IN U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 11–14 (2009) 
(describing programs as of 2009). 
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(1) Energy: In an energy market, utilities and other load-
serving entities151 purchase electricity for delivery within the next 
hour or a day ahead. Demand response resources have participated 
in energy markets to substitute for electricity sold at the market 
price, as discussed in FERC v. EPSA. 
(2) Capacity: Some, but not all RTOs, have developed 
“capacity” markets to provide additional incentives for new power 
plant construction. A capacity market is a forward-looking market, 
in which participants commit to serve future demand with new 
generating capacity.152 Thus, a bid in a capacity market is 
essentially a standby promise that demonstrates the bidder’s ability 
to deliver electricity in the future to meet demand. These markets 
focus on “installed capacity”—resources a utility or other load-
serving entity must have available to serve customers—either by 
owning and operating power plants or by purchasing capacity in 
the market. Demand response participates in these markets by 
substituting for other forms of capacity. In the PJM region, for 
example, a mandatory commitment to be available as needed to 
reduce demand is most frequently compensated in the capacity 
market.153 
(3) Ancillary services: These markets compensate providers of 
“regulation” (an industry term of art for keeping grid frequency in 
balance) and several different types of reserve services that enable 
the reliable transmission of electricity.154 Ancillary service markets 
                                                
 151 A “load-serving entity” is an entity that “secures energy and Transmission 
Service (and related Interconnected Operations Services) to serve the electrical 
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers.” N. AM. ELEC. 




 152 See generally Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. OF 
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 47 (2013). 
 153 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE MARKET 
REPORT FOR PJM: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 255 (2016), 
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2016/2
016q3-som-pjm-sec6.pdf. 
 154 Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 203. 
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still have comparatively little demand response participation,155 but 
demand response can increasingly help provide services such as 
frequency regulation.156 
Wholesale market programs have always faced criticism as an 
inefficient way station to dynamic pricing, being perennially 
susceptible to the argument that dynamic pricing would be more 
efficient.157 Yet if “the most important barrier to demand response 
in wholesale markets is the lack of dynamic pricing,”158 then we 
need wholesale market programs if we are to have any demand-
side participation at all for quite some time to come.159 Moreover, 
unlike wholesale market programs, grid operators cannot 
implement dynamic pricing. Only state PUCs can do that, as it 
directly changes retail rates,160 and they have been reluctant to act. 
In recognition of this, some commentators who are skeptical about 
demand response accept wholesale market programs if they are 
properly limited.161 
                                                
 155 The reasons for this are discussed at length in JASON MACDONALD ET AL., 
LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING ANCILLARY 
SERVICES: A COMPARISON OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE US 
WHOLESALE MARKETS (2012). 
 156 FERC’s Order 755 changed the policies for pricing of frequency regulation 
service. Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale 
Power Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct. 20, 2011). Infra notes 272–282 and 
accompanying text (discussing barriers addressed by this pricing policy). 
 157 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. HOGAN, DEMAND RESPONSE COMPENSATION, NET 
BENEFITS AND COST ALLOCATION: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 6 (2010), 
http://lmpmarketdesign.com/papers/Hogan_DR_Tech_Conf_091310.pdf. 
 158 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41. 
 159 That the need for wholesale market programs is apparent due to the lack of 
dynamic pricing has been recognized for well over a decade, suggesting the 
obvious: it might be another decade or more before this is not the case. 
BRAITHWAIT & EAKIN, supra note 38, at 4 (“The current environment of largely 
regulated retail prices and little dynamic pricing arguably creates an apparent 
need for ISO/RTO market intervention to encourage some form of demand 
response.”). 
 160 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 2; cf. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, 
at 413 (noting that when FERC intervened in the California crisis, “it stated that 
‘State regulators have the most significant authorities to encourage demand 
reduction measures.’”). 
 161 Pierce, supra note 7. 
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1. RTOs’ Demand Response Programs and the Role of 
Aggregators 
By summer 2001, four RTOs had demand response programs: 
in addition to California, these included ISO-New England, New 
York, and PJM Interconnection.162 In 2001, FERC accepted PJM’s 
proposed Load Response Program163 with an Emergency Option 
and Economic Option.164 Also in 2001, the New York ISO began 
an emergency-based program (the Emergency Demand Response 
Program), and an economic program in its energy market (the Day-
Ahead Demand Bidding Program).165 Since 1999, New York ISO 
had in place the ICAP-SCR (Installed Capacity-Special Case 
Resources) program, which allowed participants to be designated 
“Special Case Resources” if they had the ability to reduce demand 
when called.166 As utilities and load-serving entities could use these 
resources to meet their installed capacity requirements, this was 
(and is today)167 a true capacity market. As noted below, these 
programs have been supplemented since then by other markets in 
the various regions. 
                                                
 162 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 3. 
 163 Id. at 8; Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 402. 
 164 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 18. 
 165 COWART, supra note 110, at 15 (discussing the origins of these programs 
as a result of studies indicating constrained electricity supplies in New York. 
FERC’s approval of the New York ISO programs drew a jurisdictional objection 
similar to that which would be made later against Order 745: demand reductions 
involved retail customers and fell within state PUC jurisdiction.); JASON R. 
SALMI KLOTZ, FERC POLICY ON DEMAND RESPONSE AND ORDER 719 3 (2009), 
http://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/forum_papers09/klotz.pdf. 
 166 Demand Response Programs, N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 
http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/market_data/demand_respons
e/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 167 In its most recent filing with FERC about program information and 
statistics, the New York ISO describes the EDRP, DADRP, and its other 
programs. See generally N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON 




[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS]. 
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RTOs’ programs differ widely in their designs of such features 
as timing of notification of demand reductions and pricing168 and 
payment, although some features are common to most programs. 
As an example, the New York ISO emergency-based program 
offered customers willing to curtail demand on two hours’ notice 
payments based on the higher of LMP or 50 cents per kWh. By 
2002, this program had nearly 1500 MW enrolled. Calls in 
emergency programs are event-driven, taking place on relatively 
few days of the year (usually summer peak demand days169). The 
New York ISO economic program enabled retail customers to 
participate directly in the day-ahead electricity market by 
submitting bids of demand reduction to compete with generation, 
but was far less popular than the emergency-based program, due to 
a confusing design and other issues.170 
The overwhelming majority of demand reductions in the 
program’s first year came from actual load reductions, but as much 
as 15% of the reductions were offset by commercial and industrial 
participants using on-site generators, mostly diesel. Over time, this 
would lead to criticism of demand response as neither reducing 
demand (but simply shifting it to other times or generation sources) 
nor reducing pollution. Also, there was little to no direct 
participation by retail customers in these programs.171 Instead, as a 
2002 report observed, the participants were utilities, other load-
                                                
 168 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 51. 
 169 See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, SUMMARY OF PJM-INITIATED 
LOAD MANAGEMENT EVENTS 1991-PRESENT, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-
operations/demand-response.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (summarizing days 
in each year on which demand response was called, spanning back to 1991). 
 170 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41. This is also true today in New York ISO. 
ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMAND RESPONSE, supra note 167, at 4, 5 (showing that 
EDRP and ICAP-SCR have 1266.7 MW of capacity enrolled, compared to 106.5 
MW in ancillary services markets). Other regions have comparable figures, as 
discussed more fully below in the context of barriers to demand response 
participation. For example, 99% of PJM demand response is emergency demand 
response. MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE 
MARKET REPORT, supra note 153, at 255. 
 171 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41. Many factors contributed to this, including 
a lack of enabling technologies such as smart meters, as discussed more fully 
below for programs throughout the decade. 
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serving entities, and aggregators (the CSPs discussed above).172 
The New York ISO was an early innovator in allowing aggregators 
to participate in its programs, permitting CSPs to participate 
without being licensed to sell electricity.173 One-quarter of the 
participants in New York’s demand response programs in 2001 
were CSPs.174 
In recent years, CSPs’ aggregation, measurement, and 
verification capabilities have improved greatly, through more 
widespread deployment of enabling technologies such as “smart 
meters,” advanced communications protocols, and intelligent 
devices such as programmable thermostats. In the Internet age, 
stamped movie receipts are not necessary for measurement and 
verification, either. The increasing ability to aggregate resources 
can give RTOs more reliable and controllable reductions for a 
longer time period, and spread out the risk of customers not 
curtailing demand when called.175 
Some oppose this form of aggregation as inefficient.176 Utilities 
could fulfill this role,177 and indeed they would appear to be 
“natural aggregators for ISO demand response programs”178 due to 
their direct interaction with their customers and established 
systems for interacting with the wholesale markets. On the other 
hand, utilities sell electricity, so their incentives to bid aggregated 
blocks of demand reductions into wholesale markets are limited.179 
                                                
 172 Id. at 16. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 203–05. 
 176 For example, in his comments on FERC’s 2008 demand response rule, 
Order 719, discussed in more detail below, industry economist Robert Borlick 
stated that, “ARCs [aggregators of retail customers] are not the best means for 
promoting demand response resources.” Wholesale Competition in Regions with 
Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,101 (Oct. 28, 2008) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35.28 (2012)) [hereinafter Order 719]. 
 177 In PJM markets, for example, they are explicitly allowed to do so. PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, LLC, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY SERVICES 
OPERATIONS 17 (Rev. 86, Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx (explaining that 
PJM Members can be CSPs). 
 178 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47. 
 179 Id. at 47. 
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Independent firms whose primary business is providing demand 
response have stronger financial incentives than utilities to grow.180 
Larger firms such as EnerNOC, Comverge, and Viridity have 
sophisticated business models, providing services to certain 
industries or market segments, and developing demand response 
solutions for residential customers, although this market is still 
small. And they can compete on price and offer more services of 
value to customers.181 
In the mid-2000s, market opportunities for demand response 
began to take off. In particular, the implementation of capacity 
markets182 led to an increase in demand response participation.183 
For example, the PJM capacity market, the Reliability Pricing 
Model (RPM184) began in 2007.185 The RPM is administered in a 
series of auctions that occur during a three-year period before the 
delivery of electricity.186 The PJM Manual for the capacity market 
spells out a detailed set of requirements that resources must meet. 
Some requirements are performance characteristics for demand 
response, such as the ability to respond within two hours if 
called.187 Payments are guaranteed monthly. The guaranteed 
                                                
 180 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 60. 
 181 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47–48. 
 182 FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 47 (noting that before the advent of 
capacity markets, “demand response resources must rely on bilateral contracts 
that may not provide the price transparency necessary to ensure that these 
resources are fairly compensated and to encourage additional provision of 
capacity by new demand response resources”). 
 183 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, LOAD MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
REPORT 2009/2010, supra note 148 (discussing the rise in demand response 
performance after the advent of the RPM). 
 184 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, CAPACITY MARKET (RPM), 
http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 
2017). The requirement to purchase capacity is known as the “capacity 
obligation.” Id. 
 185 PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006) (approving the 
RPM). 
 186 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION FAQS, 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-
residual-auction-faqs.ashx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 187 PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET 
60–63 (Rev. 36, Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m18.ashx. 
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revenue stream and increasing ability of CSPs to meet PJM’s 
requirements led to a surge in DR capacity market participation by 
the end of the decade. In turn, this made up the lion’s share of PJM 
demand response activity.188 
While capacity market participation increased, participation in 
ancillary services markets increased more slowly, and is still small 
today.189 PJM added an ancillary services demand response 
program in 2006; the Midwest ISO and New York ISO did so in 
2008.190 There are several different types of ancillary services and 
different technical requirements for each. As an example, CSPs in 
the PJM RTO today offer demand response in “synchronized 
reserve” and “frequency regulation” markets. Reserve resources 
respond to contingency events, such as the loss of a large generator 
or transmission line; one tier of PJM’s “synchronized reserves” 
product, for example, requires reserves capable of responding 
within 10 minutes.191 Frequency regulation refers to quick 
adjustments made to keep the grid in frequency balance. Resources 
that provide these adjustments must be available nearly 
immediately on a grid operator’s signal.192 Traditionally, only 
power plants provided these services,193 but today as technologies 
                                                
 188 See, e.g., MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE 
MARKET REPORT, supra note 153, at 255. 
 189 Id. (showing a synchronized reserve made up 0.5% of PJM demand 
response activity in 2015). 
 190 N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 112 FERC ¶ 61,283 (2005); Midwest 
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., order on reh’g, 123 FERC ¶ 61,297 
(2008); Cal. Indep. Sys. Op., 116 FERC ¶ 61,274 (2006); PJM Interconnection, 
LLC, 114 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2006). 
 191 PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY 
SERVICES OPERATIONS 83 (Rev. 86, Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx (last visited Feb. 
21, 2017) [hereinafter PJM MANUAL 11]; see HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 
44 (describing reserves generally). 
 192 PJM MANUAL 11, supra note 191, at 65 (stating that there is a requirement 
for being able to follow an automatic generation control (AGC) signal); HURLEY 
ET AL., supra note 50, at 45. 
 193 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at vii. 
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improve, and, in particular, as demand response becomes more 
automated,194 it is capable of providing many of these services.195 
With these and other developments came more opportunities 
for CSPs, such as the ability to bid into multiple markets, often 
simultaneously with the same resource. However, barriers to 
participation persist today. The next section discusses the wide 
range of barriers that have been identified and addressed over the 
course of the past fifteen years. 
2. Barriers To Demand Response Participation 
Despite promising developments, during the first half of the 
2000s there was suboptimal demand response participation in 
wholesale markets,196 and even now there is little residential 
participation.197 FERC has estimated potential reductions in peak 
demand of up to 20%,198 but concluded that only a fraction of this 
potential has been realized. There are many different reasons for 
this underperformance, including economic, regulatory and 
technological barriers. To understand the policies implemented in 
the foundational FERC Orders on demand response, it is necessary 
to understand these barriers. 
From the outset, because demand response is fundamentally 
different from generation,199 it struggled to find a level playing 
                                                
 194 Id. at 23; Marc Frincu et al., Enabling Automated Dynamic Demand 
Response: From Theory to Practice, http://saimacs.github.io/pubs/2015-
eenergy-group.pdf (discussing challenges in building automated demand 
response systems). Automating demand response is of particularly keen interest 
to aggregators because without it, “[t]he process of sending and aggregating the 
responses from multiple parties is notoriously cumbersome and time 
consuming.” Scott Neumann et al., How to Get More Response from Demand 
Response, 19 THE ELECTRICITY J. 24, 28 (2006). 
 195 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 45. 
 196 Id. at 22. 
 197 Id. at 11; PANFIL & FINE, supra note 129, at 7 (stating that demand 
response has “primarily attracted large industrial, agricultural and commercial 
consumers”). 
 198 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND 
RESPONSE POTENTIAL x at Fig. ES-1 (2009). 
 199 See COWART, supra note 110, at 37 (“The focus of most decision-makers 
on supply-side solutions to meet load growth and reliability needs is perhaps a 
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field in wholesale markets designed to trade power. The markets’ 
“supply-centric focus”200 created numerous obstacles. As a 2002 
report indicated, “designing demand response programs that work 
within the supply-based ISO structures has been a challenge.”201 
Each year since 2006, as required under the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, FERC has identified barriers to greater demand response 
participation in wholesale markets in its annual reports on 
advanced metering and demand response programs.202 A 2013 
report by researchers at the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (“LBNL”) on demand response203 created a useful 
taxonomy to study these barriers in more depth, dividing them into 
six categories. 
The first category involves threshold barriers, in which the 
RTO explicitly excludes demand response from participating 
altogether.204 An example is a market rule that disallows demand 
response participation in an ancillary services market, as in the 
ISO-New England RTO regulation market as recently as 2013.205 
The reasons for this might be an RTO’s judgment that demand 
response cannot technically provide the service, even if others such 
as researchers who study demand response believe this is not 
accurate.206 Some RTOs also prohibited aggregators from 
providing specific individual ancillary services, further narrowing 
market opportunities.207 
                                                                                                         
natural product of the manner in which franchises and electricity markets have 
evolved.”); KATHAN, supra note 30, at 34. 
 200 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 22. 
 201 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 9–10. 
 202 EPAct 2005 section 1252(e)(3) required FERC to prepare an “an annual 
report, by appropriate region, that assesses demand response resources.” FERC 
has prepared this report - the Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced 
Metering - each year since 2006. The most recent report is FERC DR-AM 2016, 
supra note 22. 
 203 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 33–47, lists fifteen pages’ worth of 
individual specific barriers in tabular form. 
 204 The report terms these “[b]arriers associated with Bulk Power System 
Service Definitions.” CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at ix; see also HURLEY ET 
AL., supra note 50, at 22. 
 205 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 10. 
 206 See generally id. 
 207 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 11. 
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Next, once a demand response resource is eligible to participate 
in the market, it must meet that market’s performance-based 
rules.208 RTOs’ rules for bidding specify performance parameters 
that can restrict demand response participation.209 Performance 
criteria can be defined in terms that only a power plant could meet, 
such as an ancillary services market rule that required “100 MW of 
unloaded, on-line capacity from a large fuel-burning generator” 
instead of the more neutral “100 MW of response that can be 
delivered within 10 minutes.”210 Another typical barrier is a 
minimum size threshold. Often, energy markets have minimum 
bids of 1 MW for aggregated bids and 100 Kw for individual 
participants, which is a far larger amount than smaller customers 
can provide.211 Aggregation can overcome this by combining 
demand reductions from individual customers into larger blocks. 
However, market rules can sometimes make it difficult for 
aggregators to participate.212 Proving that rule barriers persist 
today, a controversial “pay for performance” rule is currently the 
subject of litigation in the D.C. Circuit.213 This rule prevents 
demand response from achieving the highest level of payment in 
                                                
 208 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9 (terming these “Attributes of 
Performance”). 
 209 Id. at 11–12 (“In defining the performance attributes required to provide 
certain bulk power system services in ISO/RTO jurisdictions . . . ISO/RTOs 
have included rules and requirements that may limit the pool of eligible demand 
response resources to provide AS (e.g., limitations on resource size, the ability 
to aggregate multiple small resources, geographic boundaries of aggregation, 
and symmetric response capabilities).”). 
 210 COWART, supra note 110, at 49 (discussing this with respect to ancillary 
services markets). 
 211 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47. 
 212 For an example of a barrier applying to aggregators see Order 719, supra 
note 176, at 64,118 (“[E]fforts to aggregate small retail loads have not been 
successful primarily due to the requirement that every small resource in an 
aggregated group meet the same registration, measurement and verification 
standards as large generators.”). 
 213 Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., No. 16-1234 
(D.C. Cir.). 
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the PJM capacity market unless it can perform for the entire year, 
which seasonal demand response resources cannot do.214  
Technology barriers also pose problems.215 The well-known 
one is the need for smart meters, which are indispensable216 to 
widespread demand-side participation (in the residential sector, in 
particular) because precise timing of demand reductions is 
essential.217 States have been inconsistent over the years in 
providing incentives for utilities to install smart meters. Traditional 
regulatory principles require utilities to justify novel investments 
by showing that their benefits exceed the costs. Regulators may 
disallow cost recovery if they are not convinced of smart meters’ 
net benefits.218 Even today, smart meter deployment, while 
increasing, is not uniform across the nation, and just over 40% of 
electricity customers have them.219 
                                                
 214 Under this, the PJM requires that resources must be “capable of sustained, 
predictable operation, and are expected to be available and capable of providing 
energy and reserves when needed throughout the entire Delivery Year.” PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, LLC, SEASONAL CAPACITY RESOURCES SENIOR TASK 
FORCE, SEASONAL RESOURCES & RESOURCE AGGREGATION UNDER CP 3 (Apr. 
4, 2016), 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/task-
forces/scrstf/20160404/20160404-item-05-education-session.ashx (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2017). Aggregations of seasonally available resources such as 
residential air conditioning demand would be ineligible. Bentham Paulos, Green 
Groups Challenge PJM’s Capacity Performance Rules, POWER (July 11, 2016), 
http://www.powermag.com/green-groups-challenge-pjms-capacity-performance-
rules/. 
 215 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 10 (defining these “Enabling 
Infrastructure Investments”). 
 216 The need for smart meters for effective demand response has been 
identified for many years. See, e.g., KATHAN, supra note 30, at 39; cf. Eisen, 
Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53, at 10 
(discussing the potential benefits of smart meter deployment). 
 217 KATHAN, supra note 30, at 44; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., POLICIES FOR A 
MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 50 (2013). 
 218 Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53, 
at 17–18 (discussing a case in which the Maryland PSC initially disallowed cost 
recovery); MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 140. 
 219 Smart meter deployment tripled between 2010 and 2012, primarily as a 
result of the stimulus law of 2009 (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), 
which provided partial federal government funding for utilities to deploy them. 
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FERC has described more technology barriers, including the 
lack of standardization in the interface between the demand 
response providers and the market, measurement and verification 
challenges,220 and challenges of telemetry requirements that 
demand response providers found difficult and expensive to 
meet.221 Technologies with two-way communication capabilities 
are important for demand response, to allow for near-real-time 
verification of demand reductions. Yet there has been little 
standardization in interoperability standards for smart meters until 
recently.222 This “can create implicit barriers” to demand response 
participation.223 
The process of setting standards started after a provision of the 
2007 Energy Independence and Security Act called for a 
collaborative, federally coordinated standard-setting process, with 
leadership from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
to produce standards adopted by FERC.224 Today, this effort has 
transitioned to the private sector.225 FERC’s 2013 Order 676-G, 
                                                                                                         
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009); FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 3. At present, 40% of U.S. 
consumers have smart meters, but the extent of deployment varies widely by 
state. FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 4. 
 220 Measuring the baseline from which to gauge demand reductions—how 
much demand has the incentive reduced?—has been a challenging issue for 
years. KATHAN, supra note 30, at 29–30; Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 13. 
 221 Telemetry refers to near instantaneous metering and transfer of electricity 
consumption data to system operators. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 81 (2012) 
[hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2012]. For a discussion of telemetry requirements as 
a barrier to demand response, see Order 719, supra note 176. 
 222 See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 
supra note 53. See also FERC DR-AM 2012, supra note 221, at 49 (describing a 
“Lack of Uniform Standards” as an important issue). 
 223 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. 
 224 Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53, 
at 39–42 (discussing the inception and activities of the Smart Grid 
Interoperability Panel (SGIP)). The statutory mandate to develop standards was 
contained and described in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 1305 (2007); see FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 
15–16 (discussing the provision). 
 225 The SGIP is now a private sector organization. SGIP, http://www.sgip.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
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adopting measurement and verification standards of the North 
American Energy Standards Board, is an example of a recent order 
addressing the standards challenge.226 An important measurement 
challenge is calculating exactly how much demand has been 
reduced —which requires establishment of a baseline to compare 
against actual meter readings. RTOs used differing methodologies 
to come up with these numbers,227 and for years there has been no 
standard method of calculating baselines. 
Another type of barrier - economic barriers - includes two 
subcategories. The first is “revenue availability”: is market 
compensation sufficient to provide incentives for demand response 
participation? The highest-profile example of this, of course, is the 
situation Order 745 aimed to correct: the payment of less than the 
full energy market price to a demand response provider. The 
second type of economic barrier is “revenue capture,” or how 
market payments are made, and whether they arrive with enough 
certainty to support investment costs and provide an adequate 
return on investment. In the energy market, for example, a CSP 
receives the fluctuating energy market price. In the capacity 
market, by contrast, the CSP typically receives a consistent 
monthly payment in return for reducing demand during a small 
number of hours each year, and some ancillary services markets 
also offer a consistent payment. Not surprisingly, this predictability 
of payment (together with the ability to bid into multiple markets) 
has been a major factor in CSPs’ success.228 
                                                
 226 Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public 
Utilities, Order No. 676-G, 156 FERC ¶ 61,055 (2013). 
 227 FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 48; HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, 
at 60. RTOs are working toward more effective measurement and verification of 
demand reductions. See, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Op., Inc., 155 FERC ¶ 61,243 
(2016) (FERC approval of revisions to M&V protocols for demand response in 
New York ISO); FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 22 (describing this 
order). 
 228 HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 64 describes the profitability scenario for 
a CSP: 
However, like any business, there are upfront capital costs. For demand 
response aggregators, the costs of setting up the business, telemetry and 
metering requirements, and ongoing interactions with so many 
customers may be substantial. The business won’t work without a 
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Finally, state regulators and legislatures have created barriers 
to demand response providers’ participation in wholesale markets. 
An example discussed more fully below is licensing and other 
requirements specifying the conditions under which aggregators 
can engage with customers.229 Beyond these obstacles, there are 
procedural barriers (any reforms must be adopted through complex 
RTO governance procedures230) and non-market barriers, including 
an overall level of consumer resistance to efforts to cut back 
electricity usage. 
As FERC has noted, there is a lack of effective communication 
about demand response231 and considerable challenges relating to 
customer engagement.232 This topic is worth a full treatment in its 
own right and beyond the scope of the discussion here. As a 
general matter, as noted above, demand response is not something 
consumers inherently want.233 Consumer characteristics such as 
knowledge, awareness, and motivation often influence the success 
of a demand response program.234 However, while education and 
communication can help ameliorate this, they alone are insufficient 
                                                                                                         
robust investment case. As such, the growth of demand response has 
been strongest where a steady monthly payment is available, and where 
multiple streams of revenue are present to support different types of 
loads and different types of customers. 
 Id. 
 229 Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 84. 
 230 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. See E4 THE FUTURE, REGIONAL 
ENERGY MARKETS: DO INCONSISTENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IMPEDE U.S. 
MARKET SUCCESS? (July 2016), https://e4thefuture.org/the-future-of-net-
metering-utilities-and-solar-companies-align/ (describing the different 
governance mechanisms employed by RTOs). 
 231 FERC DR-AM 2012, supra note 221, at 49 (discussing the complexities of 
the RTOs’ various governance processes). 
 232 An effort to address these challenges is the Smart Grid Consumer 
Collaborative. Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative, http://smartgridcc.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 233 Constantine Gonatas, A Buyer’s Market, 149 No. 5 PUB. UTIL. 
FORTNIGHTLY 8 (May 2011) (“[A] true barrier exists for residential, many 
commercial and even large institutional customers: indifference and lack of 
focus on energy conservation.”). 
 234 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY ADVISORY COMM., CONSUMER 
ACCEPTANCE OF SMART GRID (June 2013), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/06/f1/Weedall.pdf. 
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because consumers are not universally receptive to information 
about the benefits of demand response.235 External influences, such 
as energy prices and the market availability of relevant 
technologies, also affect a program’s success. 
3. The Federal Response: Statutory Encouragement and 
Order 719 
Both major omnibus energy policy acts of the 2000s contained 
provisions designed to encourage demand response. Section 
1252(f) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 states that it is the policy 
of the United States to encourage “time-based pricing and other 
forms of demand response, whereby electricity customers are 
provided with electricity price signals and the ability to benefit by 
responding to them . . . .”236 In recognition of the barriers to 
demand response, it further provides that “deployment of such 
technology and devices that enable electricity customers to 
participate in such pricing and demand response systems shall be 
facilitated, and unnecessary barriers to demand response 
participation in energy, capacity and ancillary services markets 
shall be eliminated.”237 The Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 required the Commission to perform a national assessment 
of demand response potential and develop a national action plan,238 
and, as noted above, called for the development of technical 
standards.239 
In 2007, FERC held three technical conferences designed to 
assess whether barriers to demand response prevented the 
achievement of just and reasonable rates in the wholesale 
                                                
 235 Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart Grid, supra note 7, at 71; KATHAN, supra 
note 30, at 39. 
 236 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(f) (2005). 
 237 Id. 
 238 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
§ 529 (2007). FERC issued this plan in 2010. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N 
STAFF, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON DEMAND RESPONSE (2010), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response/dr-
potential.asp. 
 239 Supra notes 221–223 and accompanying text. 
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markets.240 The result was Order 719, promulgated in 2008, which 
required RTOs to make four different reforms. As noted above, 
participation in ancillary services markets was lagging.241 To 
address and rectify this situation, Order 719 required RTOs to 
accept bids from demand response resources in ancillary services 
markets, on a basis comparable to other resources, as long as they 
were technically capable of doing so.242 This would require 
considerable adjustments to RTOs’ existing market rules. RTOs 
were not required to establish new markets243 for this purpose, but 
were required to make tariff changes to bring fast acting, flexible 
demand response resources into existing energy imbalance, 
reserves, and regulation markets.244 
Order 719’s second reform required RTOs to “eliminate, 
during a system emergency, certain charges to buyers in the energy 
market for voluntarily reducing demand.”245 These specific charges 
are known as “uplift” or “deviation charges,”246 and apply when a 
buyer in the energy market takes less electric energy than it 
scheduled ahead of time to take in the real-time market. This 
causes costs, for example, “cost of extra generators committed 
after the close of the day-ahead market to serve anticipated load, if 
those costs are not recovered from sales of energy at real-time 
LMPs.”247 The methods of determining and allocating these costs 
penalized demand response resources that could respond during 
emergencies. This is an example of the sort of fine-tuning iteration 
required to accommodate demand response in a market that is not 
designed to accommodate it. 
                                                
 240 Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,101 (highlighting FERC’s statement (as it 
has in numerous other contexts involving improvements to the wholesale 
electricity markets): “Improving the competitiveness of organized wholesale 
markets is integral to the Commission fulfilling its statutory mandate to ensure 
supplies of electric energy at just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential rates.”). 
 241 CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 20. 
 242 Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,101. 
 243 Id. at 64,107. 
 244 Id.; CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 2. 
 245 Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,103. 
 246 Id. at 64,112. 
 247 Id. at 64,112 n.133. 
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Order 719’s third reform required RTOs to permit aggregators 
to bid demand response on behalf of retail customers directly into 
the organized markets, on the principle that allowing aggregation 
of small retail loads into larger blocks of demand reductions would 
reduce a barrier to demand response participation.248 At the time, 
two RTOs did not allow aggregation,249 even though it was 
successful elsewhere.250 The Order set forth ten criteria for an 
aggregator to meet. Importantly, FERC addressed a “state veto” 
issue. On the one hand, many commenters believed aggregators 
should not be able to bid into wholesale markets without the 
express permission of state regulators.251 They argued that blanket 
permission by FERC would interfere with utility demand 
management programs, place an undue burden on PUCs (for 
example, if a PUC did not want aggregators to participate in the 
state, it would have to take individual action to veto them252), and 
raise new concerns about federal and state jurisdiction by 
overriding states’ historical control over firms doing business 
there. On the other hand, some commenters argued that giving 
states a veto would hamper demand response participation in 
wholesale markets.253 In the end, Order 719 provided, “The market 
rules shall allow bids from an ARC unless this is not permitted 
under the laws or regulations of [the] relevant electric retail 
regulatory authority.”254 
                                                
 248 Id. at 64,119. 
 249 KLOTZ, supra note 165, at 1 (the two were the Midwest ISO and CAISO). 
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supra note 221, at 39–40. 
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 254 Id. at 64,119. 
404 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
Order 719’s fourth reform required RTOs to modify their rules 
governing price formation during periods of operating reserve 
shortage to allow the market-clearing price during periods of 
operating reserve shortage to more accurately reflect the true value 
of energy.255 In particular, RTOs had adopted bid caps that did not 
allow market prices to increase over those limits during periods of 
shortage. This caused underestimation of demand response’s value 
at those times when it was providing demand reductions.256 
RTOs have submitted filings to comply with Order 719 since 
2009,257 but the barriers identified still persist. FERC’s 2010 report 
on demand response, for example, noted that commenters to it 
“contended that the ISOs and RTOs continue to impose offer 
parameter requirements that do not adequately recognize the 
different characteristics of demand response and traditional 
generation resources and, therefore, do not provide for comparable 
treatment of demand response resources as required by Order No. 
719.”258 Identification and changes to rules inhibiting demand 
response bids in ancillary services markets continue to this day, 
nearly a decade after Order 719.259 
The relationship between states and demand response 
aggregators continues to be complex. Some states still bar 
aggregators, particularly in the Midwest ISO footprint.260 Others 
have conditioned CSP activities on receiving prior approval from 
the PUC, as in the case of Indiana, where state utility regulators 
claimed this provision was necessary because “allowing retail 
customers to aggregate demand response for sale through PJM 
‘would at least partially bypass’ the IURC’s oversight of the retail 
                                                
 255 Id. at 64,101. 
 256 Id. at 64,124. 
 257 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61,057 (2012) 
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 260 Id. at 25 (citing states such as Wisconsin that have prohibited the operation 
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market.”261 Indiana’s restriction was challenged successfully in the 
D.C. Circuit on procedural grounds.262 
The Indiana decision highlights the tension in allowing 
customers to enroll with CSPs, and, by extension, larger issues 
relating to empowering third parties to compete with incumbent 
utilities. By reducing demand through a firm not regulated as a 
public utility, the customer uses less electricity, thereby purchasing 
less of it from her utility and forcing the utility to rethink its rate 
design. This “bypass” issue has been recognized since the 
inception of wholesale market programs,263 as has a related issue: 
the prospect of competition for customers between utilities and 
CSPs for demand response customers.264 As it encourages 
wholesale market programs, FERC is often cautioned against 
jeopardizing utility demand management programs.265 
C. Demand Response in the Wellinghoff Era (2009-2014) 
For all the attention demand response received in the 2000s, it 
was still “tough sledding”266 until Jon Wellinghoff became FERC’s 
Chair in 2009. In Wellinghoff’s five years as FERC’s Chair, he 
accelerated the agency’s focus on demand response and other 
efforts to incorporate distributed energy resources into the bulk 
power system.267 He personally championed demand response 
                                                
 261 Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 668 
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participation in the wholesale markets,268 and under his watch, 
FERC issued two important Orders to further encourage 
participation, including Order 745 (the controversy over which 
landed in the Supreme Court) and Order 755. 
1. FERC Order 755 and Demand Response in Regulation 
Markets 
Before FERC’s Order 755, issued in 2011, the almost 
instantaneous response needed for resources providing frequency 
regulation was largely provided by power plants that could meet 
RTOs’ requirements for acting so quickly.269 RTOs differ in their 
frequency regulation products. Some offer only one product; others 
compensate for the ability to increase output quickly (known as 
“regulation-up”) or decrease it quickly (“regulation-down”).270 
Some forms of demand response can act more quickly than 
conventional power plants can start,271 and could therefore be less 
expensive and more efficient in providing frequency regulation.272 
However, RTOs’ compensation methods, generally speaking, had 
not recognized this, adopting technical parameters that discouraged 
demand response participation. 
In response, FERC adopted a two-part compensation method 
for all resources that provide regulation service. It required all 
                                                
 268 For example, in a law journal article, Wellinghoff and his co-author (who 
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ISO/RTOs to modify their tariffs to provide for a two-part payment 
to frequency regulation resources and pay all resources that clear 
the regulation market a uniform capacity payment and a 
performance payment based on the accuracy of response to system 
control signals.273 This latter requirement directly tied 
compensation to the speed and accuracy of response. Therefore, it 
promoted storage technologies such as batteries and flywheels,274 
and forms of demand response that can provide a fast and flexible 
resource capable of providing the frequency regulation service.275 
RTOs have responded to Order 755 by changing market rules 
to compensate resources that can respond to a fast signal.276 While 
these markets are small,277 they are an increasingly important venue 
for energy storage to participate in wholesale markets,278 as well as 
demand response that can meet the applicable technical 
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 278 See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: 
Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 (2014). 
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requirements. And, as more distributed energy resources are added 
to the grid, the need for flexible demand response resources to 
provide frequency regulation will only increase.279 
2. FERC Order 745 and Demand Response in Energy 
Markets  
Order 745 focused on the wholesale energy markets. In 2011, 
when it was issued after numerous rounds of comments and two 
technical conferences, there was significantly more demand 
response participation in capacity markets than in energy 
markets.280 FERC believed one reason for this was the level of 
compensation offered to demand response, which it set out to 
correct. Order 745 concluded that demand response can provide 
benefits similar to generation resources, and required wholesale 
energy markets281 to pay the same market price for demand 
response as for electricity generation. In addition, Order 745 
included a requirement that RTOs establish a “net benefits test” to 
provide payments to demand response only when energy prices 
were above a specified threshold.282  
Among the many objections to Order 745, two issues attracted 
considerable attention: the propriety of the compensation level set 
in Order 745, and FERC’s authority to issue the Order in the first 
place. 
a. The Appropriate Compensation Level: LMP or “LMP – 
G”? 
In 2011, compensation levels for demand response in the 
energy market varied significantly among RTOs. Some paid 
demand response the full market price in the energy market, 
known as the “locational marginal price” (“LMP”), but others did 
not. At the time of Order 745, PJM paid demand response 
                                                
 279 Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 202–05. 
 280 Steve Isser & Bob King, The Price Is Right?, 153 No. 12 PUB. UTIL. 
FORTNIGHTLY 14, 17 (2015). 
 281 Thus, Order 745 did not apply to emergency demand response markets, but 
only to economic participation in energy markets. Order 745, supra note 7, at 
16,659. 
 282 Id. at 16,666-67; Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 
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providers the LMP, less the generation and transmission portions 
of the retail rate.283 This formula came to be known as “LMP – G.” 
FERC believed this was inadequate to prompt demand response 
participation, claiming that if decreased demand had the same 
effect on power markets as increased supply, and if supply was 
paid the market price, then demand response should also be paid 
the full LMP. 
This position was extremely controversial. “[N]umerous 
commenters” agreed with FERC that negawatts and megawatts 
were comparable, in other words that, “an increment of generation 
is comparable to a decrement of load for purposes of balancing 
supply and demand in the day-ahead and real-time energy 
markets.”284 Some even went further and argued that demand 
response could sometimes be “superior” to generation.285 These 
commenters focused on demand response’s benefits, and the belief 
that incentive compensation could stimulate innovation in demand 
response technologies and business models.286 Others strenuously 
disagreed, arguing that demand response was not the equivalent of 
generation,287 and that customers would respond to being paid to 
curtail demand by moving generation “behind the meter,” negating 
the benefits.288 
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Harvard Professor William Hogan (the originator of the LMP 
concept), and groups including the Electric Power Supply 
Association that represented power generators which stood to lose 
market share as a result of Order 745,289 argued that those offering 
demand response into wholesale markets already received a 
benefit: the retail rate savings associated with the energy they did 
not consume.290 As a result, paying full LMP was considered 
“double-counting” and overcompensation to the demand response 
provider,291 unless the retail rate for generation (G) was subtracted 
out (that is, demand response was paid at LMP – G) to account for 
the benefit associated with not consuming.292 FERC Commissioner 
Moeller supported this view in his dissent to Order 745, arguing 
that payments at full LMP were subsidies to demand response 
providers that violated FERC’s statutory obligation to ensure just, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory rates. 
The “LMP – G” argument was criticized by those who claimed 
that demand response providers were not “merely reselling 
electricity in a purely financial transaction”293 and that pure market 
efficiency was not the only consideration motivating Order 745. As 
one analysis put it, “[t]he primary error made by the supporters of 
what has come to be styled ‘LMP – G’ was to equate the 
opportunity cost of the customer with the lost value of electricity 
consumption, ignoring other costs and considerations.”294 
b. Jurisdictional Objections 
The argument that FERC did not have the authority under the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to promulgate Order 745 was over a 
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decade in the making. Fifteen years earlier, as wholesale market 
programs were in their infancy and California was in crisis, several 
industry trade associations claimed that these programs 
impermissibly intrude on state PUCs’ regulatory turf. Under the 
FPA, FERC regulates sales of electric energy at wholesale.295 
Transactions in negawatts, the associations claimed, did not 
involve sales, as “neither ‘energy’ nor ‘contract rights to a defined 
[quota] of energy’ chang[e] hands.”296 If consumers were to cut 
back on their electricity use, that decision was for state regulators 
to make, not FERC. 
That argument would recur in FERC v. EPSA, but it would 
change shape somewhat in the interim. At one point before 2011, 
FERC (and Chairman Wellinghoff, in a law review article)297 
claimed that demand response involved a sale that it could 
regulate. As there was no “energy” being sold, but instead a 
promise to curtail using it, FERC eventually recognized that it 
would be unsuccessful to pursue that argument, and did not rely on 
it in Order 745.298 
Now, opponents switched their focus, honing in on demand 
response’s impacts on customers. In particular, they claimed that 
any setting of rates for any transaction in which retail customers 
take part is the exclusive province of the states. Several 
commenters noted on the Order 745 proposal that it is “within the 
purview of retail regulatory authorities to take into account local 
policies and concerns, and the types of demand response being 
offered, when determining the appropriate compensation level.”299 
The California PUC sought clarification that FERC was not 
attempting to regulate retail rates.300 This, of course, would later be 
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the basis of the D.C. Circuit’s holding that Order 745 directly 
regulates the retail market.301 
How was setting pricing levels in the wholesale market retail 
rate regulation? Demand response presents a “thorny conundrum” 
in that 
[I]t looks like decisions by retail electricity customers to 
use less power, in which case the states regulate it as part of 
their historical jurisdiction over retail sales of electricity. 
However, it is also a means for improving reliability of the 
wholesale markets and achieving other benefits, in which 
case FERC could regulate it.302 
Order 745’s opponents pointed to the direct link between 
wholesale market programs and retail rates. CSPs would not be 
regulated as public utilities, and they could take actions in the 
wholesale markets that would affect retail rates without the ability 
for PUCs to control them. As the Illinois Commission stated: 
[A]ny non-zero payment to a demand response resource 
reduces the revenues to generators under the state 
regulatory authority. The result is a leakage of money to an 
entity outside of the state’s regulatory authority. Therefore, 
retail rates to all customers may need to be increased in 
order to recover the costs to generators that would have 
otherwise been recovered through the purchase of 
electricity, but instead went to the payment of a demand 
response resource.303 
PUCs would have other forms of recourse in this scenario. For 
example, they could increase the rates demand response customers 
paid for the electricity they consume, which would make wholesale 
market programs less attractive by reducing the total 
compensation.304 Other commenters pointed out that if the real 
issue FERC was trying to address is the lack of dynamic pricing, 
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paying full LMP in wholesale markets would not accomplish 
that.305 As noted above, dynamic pricing has been so slow in 
coming that this objection rang a bit hollow. 
To all of this, FERC had an argument at the ready: it was 
setting compensation levels in wholesale markets, not engaging in 
retail rate setting, and it would not refrain from issuing Order 745 
because it might impact the states.306 There is an obvious 
intersection between actions FERC takes in the wholesale markets 
and actions taken by the states, as the states had just articulated.307 
But FERC was acting in the domain it controls, with its charge 
under the FPA to ensure that rates charged for energy in wholesale 
energy markets are “just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.”308 Citing to Order 719, FERC stated 
that it was only deciding what happened in the wholesale markets, 
and that it had authority over demand response’s compensation 
level “because it directly affects wholesale rates.”309 Some, 
prefiguring this eventual holding of FERC v. EPSA, agreed that 
“the FPA gives the Commission broad authority to correct market 
flaws, including compensation for demand response.”310 
3. The Impact of Order 745 and the D.C. Circuit Opinion 
Immediately after Order 745, demand response participation 
rates in wholesale energy markets increased. In PJM, for example, 
participation rates were much higher in 2014 than in 2011,311 
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although they still lagged in capacity market participation 
considerably.312 
EPSA and four other electricity industry associations promptly 
filed a petition against Order 745 in the D.C. Circuit. The resulting 
opinion of a divided three-judge panel in May 2014313 left no doubt 
from the outset where it stood. It vacated Order 745 in its entirety, 
agreeing with the petitioners that demand response is a retail 
market phenomenon, beyond the scope of FERC’s authority 
because it was “encroaching on the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate the retail market.”314 The majority opinion stated that, 
“Demand response—simply put—is part of the retail market. It 
involves retail customers, their decision whether to purchase at 
retail, and the levels of retail electricity consumption.”315 FERC 
had authority to regulate practices affecting the wholesale market, 
provided it was not “directly regulating a matter subject to state 
control, such as the retail market.”316 Because FERC had done just 
that, it could not proceed with Order 745. 
Ignoring over a century of doctrine construing the principle 
limiting agency jurisdiction over “practices affecting rates” to 
those practices directly and significantly doing so,317 the majority 
opinion further rejected FERC’s claim of authority as having no 
boundaries. If it thought it would impact the wholesale markets, 
FERC might even reach out and regulate the “steel, fuel, and labor 
markets.”318 That there were well known checks on FERC’s 
authority that would preclude it from doing this went completely 
unnoticed in the majority opinion, which barreled forth to its 
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conclusion that wholesale energy market demand response 
programs overstepped FERC’s authority. For good measure, the 
majority found that even if it were to assume that FERC had 
jurisdiction over demand response, it would overturn Order 745’s 
setting of the compensation level at full LMP as arbitrary and 
capricious.319 
Judge Edwards, in his dissent, observed that, “The task for this 
court, of course, is not to divine from first principles whether a 
demand response resource subject to Order 745 is best considered 
a matter of wholesale or retail electricity regulation. Rather, our 
task is one of statutory interpretation within the 
familiar Chevron framework.”320 Applying Chevron, he found that, 
“FERC’s explanation of its jurisdiction under the Federal Power 
Act is straightforward and sensible.”321 
D. The Aftermath, and then the Supreme Court Speaks 
The D.C. Circuit opinion endangered demand response 
participation in all wholesale markets. If FERC had no jurisdiction 
over demand response in the energy markets, it presumably had no 
authority to allow it in capacity or ancillary services markets, 
either.322 Indeed, following that logic, the utility FirstEnergy filed a 
complaint with FERC immediately after the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision, stating that demand response should be excluded from all 
wholesale markets.323 That would have harmed CSPs far more,324 
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 320 Id. at 226–27. 
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because (as noted above) the vast majority of demand response 
participation at the time was in the capacity markets. One need 
look no further than PJM, which, attempting to respond to the 
uncertainty over FERC’s authority, made controversial changes to 
its compensation model in the capacity market for demand 
response after the D.C. Circuit decision.325 One year later, it 
observed a ten percent drop in demand response participation.326 
A number of states,327 environmental groups,328 and scholars329 
disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s central contention that FERC 
lacked the authority under the FPA to issue Order 745. The 
Supreme Court concurred, in Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion for a 
six-Justice majority that upheld Order 745’s central requirement of 
paying full LMP to demand response in the wholesale energy 
markets.330 The Court stated that regulating demand response fell 
comfortably within FERC’s authority over “practices” affecting 
wholesale rates if rates are “directly” affected.331 It rejected the 
D.C. Circuit’s argument that demand response was to be left to the 
states, concluding that it directly impacted wholesale rates because 
bidding demand reductions into wholesale markets changes 
wholesale prices.332 As the Court stated, “[w]holesale demand 
                                                
 325 PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, THE EVOLUTION OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN 
THE PJM WHOLESALE MARKET (2014), 
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response is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too the rules and 
practices that determine how those programs operate.”333 The Court 
concluded, “[i]t is hard to think of a practice” that has a more 
direct impact on wholesale rates,334 as distinguished from activities 
that have “indirect or tangential impacts” on wholesale markets. 
With this distinction, the D.C. Circuit’s “parade of horribles” 
argument, that FERC could regulate the steel or labor markets if it 
so chose if Order 745 stood, was correctly swept away into 
history.335 
Notably, the Court rejected the contentions about trampling on 
state regulatory authority that had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit. 
Order 745 was not invalid just because it impacted PUCs’ rate 
setting functions; that did not foreclose FERC from acting.336 
Finally, the Court upheld Order 745’s compensation approach, 
finding that FERC “engaged in reasoned decisionmaking,” and 
“selected a compensation formula with adequate support in the 
record, and intelligibly explained the reasons for making that 
choice.”337 
The long-term ramifications of FERC v. EPSA for developing 
markets for demand response are discussed more fully below. In 
the short term, it was an obvious boost to demand response, and 
forestalled the attacks on the other regulatory efforts FERC had 
taken to promote it. As one observer noted, “FERC orders in recent 
years ha[ve] resulted in the opening of additional electricity 
markets to [demand response]; and it was these newly opened 
markets for services such as capacity, frequency regulation and 
response, reactive power, and other so-called ‘ancillary services’ 
that were ultimately at risk.”338 Moreover, the ratification of 
FERC’s broad authority under the “practices affecting rates” 
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language empowered FERC to consider even more ambitious 
policy and market development efforts, such as efforts currently 
underway to consider carbon pricing in the wholesale markets.339 
The validation of Order 745’s compensation approach was a 
watershed moment for demand-side participation in the electric 
grid. The objections to demand response being a thing at all, and 
the struggle for treatment on par with supply, evaporated. Finally, 
after decades of doubt, demand response was valued as a system 
resource, and explicitly put on the same footing as supply in the 
grid. 
IV. DEMAND RESPONSE 3.0: NEW MARKETS . . . AND NEW 
CHALLENGES 
Even after the green light from FERC v. EPSA, however, much 
of demand response’s potential is still untapped, or “ignored.”340 
Yet with the Supreme Court’s upholding of FERC’s rules, and 
increasingly promising technologies and development of standards, 
it does seem that attention to it is popping up everywhere. Two 
exciting developments at the heart of this third generation of 
demand response are increasingly automated technologies that 
allow for more flexible demand response resources, and the 
contemplation of new opportunities for putting a value on the 
ability for resources behind the meter to provide that flexibility to 
the electric grid. 
One important avenue for demand response to be valued more 
highly is being developed at the distribution level of the electricity 
system. This part of the system is undergoing rapid change, with 
much of it seemingly aimed at being more disaggregated and 
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reliant on distributed energy resources. Several states are radically 
reforming their state regulatory processes to accelerate DER 
integration into the grid and accomplish other goals such as 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These states contemplate a 
future in which the regulated utility (and a variety of third parties 
with which it interacts, through regulatory structures designed for 
the purpose) enables customer choice through advanced 
distribution system planning and networking. Eventually, some, 
such as New York, contemplate adopting new market structures 
such as trading platforms that would provide greatly enhanced 
opportunities for DER to provide grid services. 
This Part begins with a discussion of the changing technical 
nature of demand response, and its role in the rapidly evolving 
ideas about transforming the electricity distribution system to add 
new market opportunities, describing proceedings and specific 
projects that are at the vanguard of change. While these new 
opportunities are extremely promising, the prospect of their 
success must be evaluated against the principles and lessons 
learned from the fifty-year history of demand-side participation in 
the electric grid, as discussed in the second section of this Part. 
A. Flexible Technologies and New Market Opportunities 
The very nature of demand response is shifting before our eyes. 
Technically, the early forms of demand response were one-
dimensional sources of flexibility (demand reductions controlled 
by a utility with limited customer involvement), and typically 
limited in when and how often they were required to provide 
demand reductions. A demand response resource receiving a 
capacity payment, for example, might only be called a few times 
each year. Now, technologies such as energy storage batteries, 
grid-connected electric vehicles,341 and remotely controlled water 
                                                
 341 Mark Detsky & Gabriella Stockmayer, Electric Vehicles: Rolling over 
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and space heaters342 offer the potential to reduce demand more 
frequently, perhaps in real time. 
The smart, Internet-connected grid appears to be fast 
approaching.343 With the rise of advanced control hardware and 
software and other technologies, and standards for the exchange of 
information, demand response can be more increasingly thought of 
as an automatically responsive grid resource. Residential demand 
response, which remains modest in participation compared to 
reductions from commercial and industrial customers, is “poised 
for expansion if regulators put in place the right policies to help it 
grow.”344 For example, “bring your own thermostat” programs 
being tested now345 can allow consumers to program settings from 
a smartphone or tablet and automatically offer their demand 
reductions to utilities and markets. The value of this sort of 
demand response is in its fast-acting nature and its ability to 
decrease or increase demand flexibly on a much more frequent 
basis, perhaps as often as every day.346 
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This evolution to having much more automated and 
customizable programs and expanded potential market segments is 
exciting. To date, however, compared to existing emergency and 
economic demand response programs, these programs are in their 
infancy, or as FERC describes it, “in the minority and generally 
lacking.”347 On the other hand, “[t]his dynamic is starting to change 
and additional market opportunities are beginning to be created for 
demand response to provide additional value.”348 States, in 
particular, have begun ambitious efforts to put in place policies and 
goals that will help grow the market for demand response. 
Notably, a handful of PUCs have embarked on comprehensive 
grid modernization proceedings, taking a view of the grid that calls 
for a broader portfolio of resources to meet the demands of the 
future, and a corresponding resilience in the system. These efforts 
recognize that the grid as a whole is changing rapidly. Over the 
past several years, renewable energy resources have made up a 
significant portion of new capacity additions.349 Distributed energy 
resources—including solar PV, electric vehicles and energy 
storage—are connecting to the grid in ever-growing numbers. 
Accommodating these developments has prompted the states to 
take action,350 and may tip the scale in favor of more 
experimentation with markets for distributed energy resources, 
including demand response. In today’s parlance, there might be 
more value streams for monetizing demand response, as it may be 
more useful to the grid in balancing increases in distributed energy 
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422 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
resources,351 or providing other services to local distribution 
systems. 
States including California, Illinois, Maryland, New York, 
Massachusetts, and Hawaii have begun proceedings aimed at 
reconsidering the roles and responsibilities of utilities. In New 
York, for example, the Public Service Commission began the 
Reforming the Energy Vision process in 2014, aimed at eventually 
refashioning the state’s utilities as market platform providers for 
distributed energy resources.352 In these states, there is emerging 
consideration of how markets may be organized to better 
coordinate generation (both conventional and distributed sources) 
and demand response in the distribution system, where organized 
markets do not yet exist. These markets, for example, would 
enable consumers to offer demand response to help coordinate the 
influx of large numbers of disparate types of resources on the grid. 
These emerging state policies suggest a more integrated role 
for demand response in planning and management of the 
distribution system.353 Distribution level markets would address 
different systems than the wholesale markets, and compensate for 
different services provided. An example of such a service would be 
the use of solar PV with smart inverters to supply voltage and 
reactive power regulation services on a distribution feeder line, 
which some believe it can do more quickly than traditional sources 
of power correction on distribution lines.354 Reducing demand at 
times of system stress can also help “avoid expensive distribution 
infrastructure upgrades otherwise needed to meet those peaks.”355 
Thinking about the structure of markets to create business 
opportunities at the distribution level for demand response to 
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provide services such as these remains very new, and it has not yet 
been determined how such markets will operate.  
A pioneering use of market techniques involving demand 
response is the “Brooklyn-Queens Neighborhood Program” of the 
New York utility Consolidated Edison (ConEd).356 In this program, 
ConEd is relying on demand response and other “non-wires” 
alternatives to building new infrastructure in Brooklyn and Queens 
in New York City.357 In August 2016, ConEd held a demand 
response auction as part of this program, with ten offers accepted 
totaling 22 MW of demand response by 2018.358 Adding demand 
response to its system in this fashion allows ConEd to defer over 
$1 billion in substation construction and other investments. 
More will be needed to capitalize on distribution level demand 
response market opportunities. Regulatory frameworks should 
create opportunities, define services to be provided in such a way 
that demand response can participate, and establish institutional 
structures that put demand response on a level playing field with 
generation. This will require the involvement of distribution 
utilities, which have been active players in the state grid 
modernization proceedings. New York has chosen the distribution 
utilities to operate the distribution system and serve as platform 
providers. This will require focused attention in the development 
of market structures to ensure that demand response is adequately 
compensated. 
Besides this, there will be an increasing need for coordination 
and integration of these new distribution level market opportunities 
with the existing wholesale markets. The two will intersect in 
significant ways,359 as the New York ISO recently described in a 
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“roadmap” document describing means for integrating new 
distribution level markets with its wholesale markets.360 An 
important issue, among others, that may recur frequently during 
this coordination process is that demand response could 
simultaneously provide a distribution level service (e.g., feeder 
relief, say) and a wholesale level service (e.g., frequency 
regulation in an ancillary services market).361 It will be important to 
ensure that these opportunities are aligned, through proper design 
of distribution market rules and alignment with existing wholesale 
market rules, to avoid hampering demand response participation.362 
These, and a myriad of other challenges, await the states as 
they move forward. Although some challenges are new, others are 
not. Demand response has been a crucible for testing important 
principles about the grid’s future, and that tells us much about the 
likelihood of success of the ongoing grid modernization efforts. 
Numerous economic, technical, and regulatory issues have been 
addressed extensively in an iterative process spanning decades, and 
it is worthwhile to pause and consider just what has been 
accomplished. 
B.  Lessons Learned Over the Past Fifty Years 
In light of these new opportunities for demand response, we 
return to the question originally posed above: when you sign up for 
Rush Hour Rewards, or a CSP bids your demand reductions into a 
wholesale market, how does that help change our one-way grid? 
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Consider this (hardly unique) statement: demand response can 
“help transform our electricity system from a one-way, centralized 
power network where customers passively receive electricity to a 
two-way flow of information where people regularly contribute to 
system operations.”363 That word “help” is doing an awful lot of 
work here, and the full extent of just how much is hardly obvious364 
unless one is aware of the decades-long evolution of demand 
response. 
Think back to Rush Hour Rewards, or aggregations of retail 
customers into a block of demand reductions for sale into a 
spinning reserve market. In the humble act of choosing to cut back 
your consumption and getting paid for it, you are selling something 
to the utility or market: the reduction in your electricity demand. If 
it seems that you are simply refraining from consumption and not 
“selling” anything that argument was made for years and then 
FERC v. EPSA soundly rejected it, full stop. You are selling 
negawatts. There have been significant and strenuous arguments 
about their value, as we have seen. However, they must have some 
value; otherwise, SCE or a CSP wouldn’t pay you for them. 
You are selling the utility something it wants, getting paid for 
your forbearance, and yet still are buying power from it. This is 
profound. Demand response fundamentally changes the way you 
interact with a utility:365 a customer (you) can be both a buyer (of 
power) and a seller (of demand reductions). You, in today’s 
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popular term, are a “prosumer” as well as a consumer.366 In a 
transaction with a CSP to aggregate your demand reductions into a 
biddable block, there is already a two-way exchange of resources. 
More demand response means more of these transactions. 
Perhaps eventually, with the advent of the state level grid 
modernization proceedings and further efforts in the wholesale 
markets by FERC, we could have a full two-way grid. Researchers 
and scholars are studying and piloting the building blocks of a 
“transactive energy” system: a true two-way grid with markets for 
electricity products and services, and decentralized control of the 
grid relying on distributed resources to provide the requisite 
flexibility.367 What would be exchanged on it and how its structure 
would look would be very different from trading in demand 
response negawatts. Advanced technologies allow for 
contemplation of a multidirectional grid, where prosumers can sell 
more services back to the grid than demand reductions from their 
buildings, solar systems, or vehicle fleets. One example that has 
been studied for years is “vehicle-to-grid” (V2G): using an electric 
vehicle’s battery as a storage device and enabling the owner to sell 
some of its charge back to a utility or CSP when the grid needs that 
small amount of power.368 Even though there are more electric 
vehicles and associated infrastructure is developing,369 V2G is still 
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a long way off. There are many more needs for a full two-way 
grid, such as a legal framework that would promote the trading of 
resources. 
The concept of a two-way exchange of resources, however, is 
on its way to full validation as a result of the evolution of demand 
response policies. In addition, the promotion of demand response 
done by third parties has enshrined the concept of competition to 
utilities and generators in wholesale markets,370 even though those 
markets were established for a completely different purpose. This 
supports an idea that is critical to the grid’s future. Consumers can 
trade in wholesale electricity markets through registered 
intermediaries, which are not utilities and have different business 
models and economic incentives. 
Thus, FERC v. EPSA validated business model competition in 
the electric grid, even if the precise legal issue was not framed that 
way, and even if full third party participation is hardly universal 
today. Notably, this progress came in the face of vigorous 
opposition from incumbent participants in the system that argued 
against it. Sellers and the intellectual titans responsible for 
designing those markets argued against letting demand response in, 
because they believed it was not power and, thus, could not be 
treated the same way. They lost that argument. By acknowledging 
CSPs, and approving an incentive meant in part to help them, the 
Court has encouraged more market competition by companies that 
do not generate electricity. This may be one of FERC v. EPSA’s 
most important accomplishments.371 
With the green light given to experimenters, it is exciting to 
speculate about the possibilities. Consider how momentous that 
may turn out to be. Still, as the history of demand response 
suggests, things tend to move slowly in this industry. This is not 
smartphones with immediate “disruption” potential.372 Advanced 
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technologies can be an important element of change, and, indeed at 
times, are an obvious prerequisite to change, as in the case of smart 
meters. But as we have seen in the fifteen-year history of demand 
response in the organized electricity markets, technology alone 
does not drive immediate institutional change. Answers will take 
much longer than the time scale of recent innovations in 
technology. The basic questions have been asked for decades, but 
institutional change has not followed as swiftly. 
As the discussion above demonstrates, throughout its history 
demand response has found it difficult to achieve a level playing 
field in markets designed to trade power. It is “something 
different–not quite efficiency, not quite supply,” but treated as “a 
load-modifying resource that is sometimes paid as though it were a 
supply resource.”373 Because demand response is not power, 
market rules have had to be created or aligned over time to make it 
viable. FERC’s support in rules such as Orders 719, 745, and 755 
has been essential to enable greater participation of demand 
response. And most recently, it issued a proposed rule to promote 
storage in the organized wholesale markets and suggest that RTOs 
look to California’s DER aggregation proposal to knock down 
more barriers preventing distributed resource participation in 
wholesale markets.374 
There is no reason to believe that this active policy support will 
be any less essential in the states’ grid modernization proceedings. 
Indeed, given that the results might include complete 
transformations of the role of distribution utilities, it is even more 
                                                
 373 DAN DELUREY, THE WEDGEMERE GRP., DEMAND RESPONSE: THE ROAD 
AHEAD 2 (2015), http://wedgemere.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Evolution-
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 374 Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional 
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MAY 2017] Demand Response’s Three Generations 429 
unlikely that demand response would find acceptance without 
policy support.375 Mandates and market rule reforms by the states 
will be a central component of expanding demand response’s 
reach. And some more lessons from the history of encouraging 
demand response participation in the organized wholesale markets 
will be significant here as well. There will be geographic 
differences in how fast conditions change. Throughout demand 
response’s history, market experiments have not been uniform 
across the nation and have been more successful in certain 
individual regions and markets than others. That variability is 
likely to continue for some time. Policies are iterative in their 
nature; note that FERC’s Orders acted to address problems in each 
of the three different categories of markets as specific barriers were 
identified and addressed. Again, we would expect that sort of 
policy development activity at the state level. 
Finally, prompting recalcitrant actors to accept demand-side 
participation and conceptualizing demand response’s role at times 
of momentous industry transformations has always required the 
presence of visionary regulators who have combated the forces 
tending to inertia. As the need for policy innovation presents itself 
now in a different setting, those familiar with the history of 
demand response will articulate more forcefully for its inclusion in 
the grid of the future. Change in this industry is always difficult, 
and, as FERC v. EPSA suggests, powerful interests still remain 
aligned against the full incorporation of demand response 
resources. Distribution utilities are entrenched monopolies that are 
unlikely to face their demise anytime soon.376 With the assistance 
of groups representing power generators, they can (and do) portray 
demand response as inefficient or unwanted.377 And consumers still 
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have not overwhelmingly pushed for more of it. Thus, as exciting 
as it is to think of the networked future for the grid—and even the 
potential for legal frameworks that could leap well beyond what 
the states are doing today378—one should get comfortable in 
thinking of years, rather than months, and settle in for the long 
haul. 
CONCLUSION 
“What’s past is prologue,” Shakespeare wrote.379 So it is here, 
as the lessons of five decades of promoting demand-side 
participation in the grid inform the future. Even as transformative 
change is everywhere in the electric grid, optimism and enthusiasm 
for how fast things will change must be tempered by the realities of 
the grid. The enormous potential of demand response has been 
recognized for decades, but we still have nowhere near as much of 
it as we could, and technology alone will not guarantee industry 
disruption. The technological change since the 1970s is impressive, 
but it has always outstripped institutional change, and change in 
this industry takes time. Progress will not be linear. There will be 
advances and setbacks. 
Demand response is not a new invention. Its basic concepts 
have been understood for decades. And as for the connectedness 
that everyone believes is on the horizon, we have been talking 
about “smart homes” since the 1980s.380 Yet there have been 
important changes since then for demand response, which has 
demonstrated that it can serve as a reliable and economic resource 
for wholesale markets and has finally been recognized as a system 
resource on par with generation. 
This Article has described the “market pathways” that brought 
us to the present day, and that (combined with other technology 
and regulatory innovations) might lead to a radically different 
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 379 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 1. 
 380 Oren, supra note 61, at slide 7. 
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electric grid in the years to come. And so, instead of being ignored, 
compared to building new power plants, demand response has 
become something else entirely: a vanguard of this new electric 
grid, a spark for entrepreneurs and pilot projects, and a test bed of 
important regulatory principles like frameworks for interactivity 
with the grid, the role of third parties and new business models, 
and the split of regulatory jurisdiction between states and FERC. 
Decades from now, “demand response” won’t exist in its 
current forms. No one today uses a “Hush-a-Phone,” the 
rudimentary voice silencing device for telephones of the 1920s 
through 1950s.381 But everyone takes it as a given that they can use 
phone lines for private benefit without the phone company’s 
consent, a principle decided in the seminal case involving that 
widget. So even if we don’t have demand response in the long-
term, we may well remember that FERC’s Orders, FERC v. EPSA, 
state policies, and other initiatives made a very different electric 
grid possible. 
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